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This study examines the major components and issues
involved in the Reserve officer augmentation process in the
United States Marine Corps. A complete description of the
legal background, quota determination process and selection
method is presented. In addition, a framework for analysis
of the augmentation process is outlined as a guide to future
research. An analysis using the 1985/1986 Officer Exit
Surveys, demographic. data, and fitness report performance
was done to study the differences between Regular and
Reserve officers. This analysis attempted to assess the
type of officer ' the Marine Corps is losing and how
augmentation plays a role in this attrition. The results
were inconclusive as to performance differences between the
two groups, however. Reserve and Regular officers had marked
differences in their reasons for leaving the Marine Corps.
This study does not conclude whether or not augmentation is
a problem, but rather provides a logical, objective research
methodology in which to undertake analysis of the issue.
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The problem of retention, especially officer retention,
has- plagued the military for some time. The All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) has brought military manpower planning to the
forefront of manpower research. The issues of retention and
recruitment planning to meet Congressionally-mandated
authorizations have sparked a great deal of manpower supply
analysis. Frequently overlooked, however, is the military's
management of the existing manpower stock. Many studies
have analyzed the causes and effects of the attrition of
military members, but few, if any, have evaluated the
manpower management policies of the services and their
impact on attrition. Quite often a service's manpower
policies will have the most significant impact on the
perceptions and intentions of its personnel. The focus of
this thesis is to develop a framework for analyzing an
important officer manpower planning issue - the augmentation
process in the United States Marine Corps.
Marine Corps officers are accessed primarily from
Officer Candidate School (OCS), Naval Reserve Officer
Training Corps (NROTC), U. S. Naval Academy, and the Platoon
Leaders Class (PLC) programs. The historical breakdown is
shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
MARINE CORPS OFFICER ACCESSIONS, BY SOURCE
SOURCE % OF NEW ACCESSIONS
Officer Candidate Class (OCC) 10.0




Enlisted Commission Program/ 6.9
Marine Enlisted Scientific
Education Program (ECP/MCSEP)
Women Officer Candidate Class (WOO 1.8
100.0
[Ref. 1]
Only those officers accessed from the Naval Academy and the
NROTC Scholarship program (95% of all NROTC officers)
automatically receive Regular commissions. The remainder
are commissioned as officers in the Marine Corps Reserve and
assigned to active duty for usually a 3 1/2 year period.
A Regular officer is a person who holds a permanent
appointment in a commissioned grade above Chief Warrant
Officer-4 (CWO-4) in the Regular Marine Corps. A Reserve
officer is one who holds a permanent appointment in a
commissioned grade above CWO-4 in the Marine Corps Reserve.
Such an officer may be on active duty or in the Ready
Reserve and not on active duty. [Ref. 2:p. 15]
The major difference between the two types of
commissions (officers), for purposes of this thesis, is
career opportunity. Career opportunity is defined as the
probability that an officer will be able to make the Marine
8
Corps a career, if he chooses to do so. The Regular
commission has an indefinite expiration date, and as such,
these officers serve at the pleasure of the President of The
United States. As long as these officers are promoted, they
may stay in the Marine Corps, on active duty, for
essentially as long as they desire. By contrast, Reserve
officers are usually obligated for 3 1/2 years. During this
initial period of active duty, these officers must apply for
appointment into the Regular Marine Corps, or request
extended active duty (EAD), if they desire to stay on active
duty (augmentation). If unsuccessful, these officers are
released from active duty. The issue is that Reserve
officers must not only be promoted to remain on active duty,
but they must also clear the substantial hurdle of
augmentation. The augmentation step creates the difference
in career opportunity between Regular and Reserve officers.
Augmentation is the process by which a Reserve officer
in the grades of Second Lieutenant through Colonel is
appointed in the Regular Marine Corps. [Ref. 2:p. 15]
Augmentation is a controversial and pertinent topic for many
reasons, some of which are listed below:
1. The majority (67 percent) of new officer accessions
each year hold Reserve commissions. Therefore, aug-
mentation impacts most junior Marine officers.
2. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)
strongly intends an all-Regular career officer force
by the 11th year of commissioned service. This
imposes a legal career constraint on Reserve officers.
3. Reserve officers perceive an inequality in career
opportunities because those officers who are awarded
Regular commissions initially (Naval Academy, NROTC
Scholarships) do not have to compete for augmentation.
4. A key question arises - "Are we keeping the best
officers?" This doubt surfaces primarily from the
career opportunity differences between Regular and
Reserve officers. Some Regular officers can remain
on active duty for up to 12 years (until the Major's
promotion board) as marginal performers while
Reserve officers have the unique screening of aug-
mentation to "weed out" the weaker officers. The
Marine Corps needs an answer to this quality question.
The Marine Corps needs to analyze the costs and benefits
of augmentation policy. Is it wise to release a Reserve
officer from active duty without possibly recouping
substantial training costs?
A sound, analytical study of the augmentation process
can help eliminate many misconceptions about the process and
ensure that the policy is effective in shaping a high
quality career officer force in consonance with
Congressionally-mandated limits.
B. OBJECTIVES
To date, a comprehensive study of the augmentation
process and its manpower implications has not been done.
Many fragmented areas have been analyzed, but a policy with
as many positive and negative spillover effects must be
studied as a total manpower program. This thesis will
attempt to provide others with a framework for a
comprehensive study of the augmentation process which can be




The primary research question of this thesis is: "What
are the principal components of the augmentation process and
how can they be analyzed in order to evaluate Marine Corps
officer augmentation policy?"
A secondary research question is: "Through Analysis of
1985/86 Officer Exit Surveys and matching performance data,
can inferences be drawn about the attitudes and quality of
Reserve and Regular officers the Marine Corps is losing?"
Specifically, are the Reserve officers who failed
augmentation notably different from the Regular officers who
left the Marine Corps voluntarily?
D. SCOPE
The areas specifically addressed in this thesis will be
as follows: (1) the legal authority, guidelines, and impact
of DOPMA; (2) augmentation quota determination and promotion
flow points; (3) the Officer Retention (augmentation) Board
(ORB) composition and methodology; (4) a statistical
presentation of the ORB results for 1983-87; (5) the
framework needed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this
issue; and (6) an analysis of the 1985/86 Officer Exit
Surveys and performance data on Reserve officers who failed
augmentation and Regular officers who left voluntarily.
This thesis will be primarily a research and management
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guide. Limitations on the thesis are the lack, of ORB
results prior to 1983 and the paucity of previous research
on augmentation.
The assumptions of this thesis are: (1) the 1985/86
Officer Exit Surveys are reflective of the attitudes of the
majority of departing officers; (2) 1985 and 1986 were
typical years of officer attrition; and (3) no radical
changes to force size are likely.
E. DEFINITIONS
Active Comissioned Service. Service on active duty as a
commissioned officer or commissioned warrant officer.
Active Duty. Full-time duty in the active military
service of the United States. It includes duty on the
active-duty list; active military service to pursue
special work; active military service in preparing and
administering policies and regulations, organizing, re-
cruiting, instructing, and training which affect the
Reserve component; full-time training duty; annual
training duty, and attendance, while in the active mili-
tary service, at a school designated as a service school
by law or by the Secretary of the Navy.
Active-Duty List. A list of all officers on active duty
in the Marine Corps, except those officers described in
sections 265, 672(d), 678, and 641 of Title 10 U.S. Code
(e.g., Reserve officers on active duty for training,
Full-Time Support, etc).
Applicant. An officer who applies, or who is considered
without making formal application, for transfer.
Augmentation. The appointment of a Reserve officer in
the Regular Marine Corps under sections 531-533 of Title
10 U.S. Code or the appointment of a Reserve warrant
officer in the Regular Marine Corps under sections 555




Extended Active Duty (EAD) • Active duty which is per-
formed by a Reserve officer on the active-duty list for
a specified period beyond the officer's initial active
duty obligation or obligated service.
Officer Retention Board (ORB).
(1) A board of commissioned officers of the Regular
Marine Corps appointed by the Secretary of the
Navy for the purpose of recommending Reserve
officers and Reserve warrant officers for trans-
fer to the Regular Marine Corps, and limited duty
officers for redesignation as unrestricted officers.
(2) The ORB may also be appointed by the CMC to serve
as the Directed Lateral Move Board, to choose
officers selected for augmentation to lateral move
from military occupational specialties (MOS's) over
in the Regular officer requirement into MOS's cri-
tically short (less than 85 percent) of the require-
ment.
Ready Reserve. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR)
and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) constitute the Ready
Reserve.
Regular Officer. An officer of the Regular Marine Corps
on the active-duty list serving under a permanent
appointment in a grade above chief warrant officer, W-4.
Standard Written Agreement (SWAG). A contract executed
under section 679 of Title 10 U.S. Code between a Reserve
officer or a Reserve warrant officer, not on the active-
duty list, and the Secretary of the Navy or his represen-
tative for that officer to serve an additional period
of active duty of 1 to 5 years.
Unrestricted Officer. An officer in the grade of
second lieutenant or above not designated for limited
duty.
[Ref. 2:p. 15]
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II presents a review of current literature
written about augmentation and the legislative history of
current laws affecting officer management, specifically
DOPMA.
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Chapter III contains a complete description of the
augmentation process, quotas, methodology and past ORB
results
.
Chapter IV establishes the framework for analysis and
relevant questions to be studied.
Chapter V presents, the analysis and results of the
1985/86 Officer Exit Survey data. Comparisons of attitudes
and performance between Regular and Reserve officers are
presented.
Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recommendations
resulting from the analysis.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The most important reference for any discussion of
augmentation is the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
(DOPMA) of 1980. This legislation provides the impetus for
officer career management and specifically addresses Reserve
officer career administration. The Act has significantly
contributed to the augmentation controversy.
DOPMA has many purposes, three of which are germane to
this thesis. The Act:
1. Establishes new statutory limitations on the number of
field grade officers who may serve in senior grades
below Flag and General officer rank;
2. Provides common law for the appointment of Regular
officers and for the active-duty service of Reserve
officers;
3. Establishes common provisions governing career expec-
tation in the various grades. [Ref. 3:p. 3]
To fully understand the impact of DOPMA, it is necessary
to review some of the background of officer personnel
legislation.
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was a response to the
problem of having an unready officer corps each time
hostilities broke out. [Ref. 3:p. 83 This was true up to
and including World War II. Additionally, the problem of an
officer corps having the improper experience and maturity at
each command level persisted. There was no established
mechanism to remove those unfit or unready for command.
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[Ref. 3:p. 8] The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 created the
"up or out" promotion system. This system provided that
officers should move through the various ranks in cohort
groups (year groups), and considerations for promotion at
different points in their careers were established in the
Act. The Act provided that officers twice passed over for
promotion would be separated from active service or retired
within a certain number of years after selection failure,
depending on grade. [Ref. 3:p. 9]
Before World War II, most officers served 30 or more
years before retirement. The Officer and Personnel Act
established specific total years of service an officer could
serve if failing promotion. These constraints are
illustrated in Table 2.
TABLE 2
TOTAL TIME IN SERVICE LIMITATIONS FOR OFFICERS
FAILING PROMOTION UNDER THE OFFICER
PERSONNEL ACT OF 1947




Captain (Army and Air Force) 14
First Lieutenant (Army and 7
Air Force)
Navy Lieutenants and Lieutenants (junior grade) were
required to be separated following their second failure of
selection. [Ref. 3:p. 9]
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Thus the Act attempted to provide an appropriate
distribution of officers of proper maturity and experience
in the various grades - this is commonly referred to as
grade distribution.
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was not without its
shortcomings. Most of these were related to assumptions
which did not materialize. First, the Act was based on an
assumption that the Armed Forces would return to a small,
all-Regular force within ten years. [Ref. 3:p. 10] The
lawmakers did not foresee the large, standing force of the
future. Secondly, the law imposed statutory ceilings on the
number of Regular officers in each service. However, in
providing for the transition, it also gave the Secretary of
each branch authority for temporary promotions when the
number of Regular and Reserve officers on active duty was
more than the statutory ceiling of Regular officers. Later,
this second provision of the law will become an issue.
A summary of the intent of the Officer Personnel Act of
1947 is provided by the House Armed Services Committee
Report on the Act. It stated:
The Committee takes the position that it is bringing
before the House an equitable, economical, and forward-
looking officer promotion program for the services - a
program that will offer careers satisfactory enough to
attract capable men, promising enough to hold in service
the capable men already in uniform, and economical enough
to be acceptable from a budgetary standpoint. [Ref. 4]
While intent of the Act was excellent and its provisions
ground-breaking, many unforeseen events caused lawmakers to
legislate readjustments to it.
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The Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954 was
Congress' response to concerns about the increased numbers
of senior officers and the increased use of temporary
promotions. The Act was passed with the intent to better
control the grade distribution. [Ref. 3:p. 10] This law
established specific limitations on the numbers of both
Regular and Reserve officers that could serve on active duty
in the grades of 0-4 and above. Congress undertook this
action in the belief that the Officer Personnel Act of 1947
was too liberal in its provisions regarding temporary grade
structure, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps.
However, Congress did recognize that officer personnel
management could not be subject to sudden and unforeseen
fluctuations as through short-term legislation and
appropriations riders. [Ref. 3:p. 10] Congress wanted the
services to be able to conduct long-range management of the
officer force.
Congress has also passed legislation to meet special
problems. For example, in 1959 Congress passed "hump"
legislation to allow additional forced attrition for Navy
and Marine Corps officers in the grade of 0-5 and 0-6. This
provided "selection out" of the overages in the senior
grades. [Ref. 3:p. 11]
The most significant development over the years between
the previously discussed legislation and D0PMA is the
anomaly of the career active-duty Reservist. This is the
18
crucial circumstance leading to DOPMA and its important
impact on augmentation.
Prior to DOPMA, the law generated the anomaly of large
numbers of Reserve officers who served 20 years and
qualified for active duty retirement. However, the law also
provided for different handling of Reserve and Regular
officers which was often perceived as inequitable by Reserve
officers. [Ref. 3:p. 12]
The Reservist on active duty under this law was faced
with uncertain career expectation. There was no provision
for minimum time in grade prior to retirement or separation,
and the reservist could be released at any time based on the
needs of the service.
Reductions in force, especially when the services are
decreasing their strength following a war, cause
commensurate numbers of officers in various grades to be
released. It is important to note that these reductions
fell heavily upon Reserve officers. [Ref. 3:p. 12] The
grades of 0-4 to 0-6 were especially sensitive to this since
Regular officers upon attaining permanent 0-4 grade have a
career expectation of 20 years of service. Upon completion
of 20 years of service he is eligible for immediate
retirement.
Reserve officers had no such career expectation and in
times of reductions in force, could be released with
anywhere from 10 to 18 years of service, short of qualifying
for immediate retirement.
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There were two distinct advantages to being a Reserve
officer at this .time. First, a Reservist who completed 20
years active duty could receive full military retirement pay
and the full Federal civil service pay, if so employed.
This advantage was not extended to Regular officers who
retired, since the compensation law limiting the combined
income was written for Regular officers. Secondly, the law
allowed Army and Air Force officers dual consideration in
promotion boards. The officer could be considered by both
the active duty and reserve promotion boards. This caused
the situation where a Reserve officer could retire at a
grade higher than ever reached on active duty. [Ref 3: p. 13]
DOPMA, as will be discussed later, corrected these
predicaments by establishing an all-Regular career force.
A. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF DOPMA
1. Grade Table
DOPMA established authorization ceilings on the
number of officers in the grades 0-4 to 0-6. This allowance
for "field grades" is expressed in the law as a finite
number of officers in relation to the entire officer corps
of each service. This is known as the grade table,
replacing the fixed percentage limits for Regular officers
in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the grade limits
for temporary promotions of the Officer Grade Limitation Act
of 1954. The grade table is intended to help the services
keep the proper mix of age and experience, provide
20
attractive career opportunities, and establish somewhat
consistent career opportunities among the services. [Ref.
3:p. 14]
Table 3 provides the grade table for the Marine
Corps. Mathematical interpolation is used to compute
authorized strengths when the total number of commissioned
officers is in between steps (ex. if total number of
officers was 21,000).
TABLE 3
AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF COMMISSIONED MARINE OFFICERS
ON ACTIVE DUTY IN GRADES 0-4 TO 0-6 UNDER DOPMA
Total Number
of Lieutenant
Commissioned Officers Maior" Colonel Colonel
12,500 2,499 1,388 592
15,000 2,717 1,483 613
17,500 2,936 1,579 633
20,000 3,154 1,674 654
22,500 3,373 1,770 675
25,000 3,591 1,865 695
[Ref. 5:p. 73]
There are three major interacting variables balanced
to achieve proper career mix:
(1) The Grade Distribution - the numbers of officers in
each grade, (see Table 3 above)
(2) The Promotion Point - the years of service where
the greatest number are promoted.
(3) The Promotion Opportunity - cumulative opportunity
for advancement.
Table 4 contains promotion flow points and promotion




PROMOTION FLOW POINTS ( YRS AT PROMOTION)
AND PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY INTENDED BY CONGRESS
To The Grade Of Yrs at Promotion % Opportunity
Colonel 22 ± 1 50
Lt. Colonel 16 ± 1 70
Major 10+1 80
[Ref. 3: p. 18]
In addition, other variables such as retirements,
resignations, deaths and forced attrition all affect career
patterns.
It is important to note that these variables are the
key players in augmentation policy decisions. Congress
realized the delicate" balance of these variables and
suggested that any changes in the structure of the officer
corps be made carefully and with consideration of promotion
opportunity. [Ref. 3:p. 14]
DOPMA, like the Officer Grade Limitation Act did not
impose limits on grades 0-1 through 0-3. Both Acts
recognized that expansion and contraction of the officer
force to meet requirements impacts heavily on the junior
officer grades.
The grade tables for field grade officers were
designed based on the actual retention of officers around
1978-1980. [Ref 3: p. 16] The House Committee that wrote
the report to accompany the Act recognized that current
retention was lower than desirable at that time. The Act
allowed promotion "windows", that is, a time frame for
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promotion rather than a specific year. For example,
promotion to 0-5 should occur between the 15th and 17th year
of service.
A key perception of the grade tables is provided by
the following:
Recognizing that the grade tables are based, on retention
that is considerably lower than that required to reach
requirements as computed under current methodology in
the mid- to long-term, the Committee would be receptive
to legislation in the next 3 to 5 years that, in the face
of improving retention and more definitive grade require-
ment determinations, would increase the statutory ceilings
to continue to permit operation within DOPMA management
parameters (promotion opportunity and timing).
CRef. 3:p. 16]
This statement of future responsiveness to changing needs
will be utilized later by the Marine Corps to propose an
increase in its allowance of 0-4' s in order to enhance
augmentation opportunities.
2. Up-or-Out System is Retained
Lawmakers were pleased with the change in the
officer corps brought about by the "up-or-out" system. The
"up-or-out" system means that an officer must be promoted in
order to remain on active duty. DOPMA also made all
promotions permanent. Congress felt that this system has
given the Armed Forces a youthful, vigorous, and fully-
combat-ready officer corps. These objectives also apply
indirectly to augmentation opportunity. Lawmakers designed
the up-or-out system fully knowing that it would result in
passover for promotion of officers who were totally
qualified to serve in the next higher grade. The function
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of the up-or-out system is to provide at each rank, more
qualified officers than there are vacancies to fill. This
allows the services to pick the best of those qualified.
Congress wanted a competitive system where the most
outstanding are selected when the system is working
correctly. [Ref. 3:p. 19] One could argue that the
corollary of this concept is to pick the best Reserve
officers for augmentation into the Regular Marine Corps. It
would not be desirable to have more billets or a greater






DOPMA provided for a single active duty list in each
service. This list contains the names of all 0-1 's and
above on active duty except for retired officers and certain
Reserve officers specifically excluded from the grade table.
[Ref. 3:p. 24] The active duty list is used to establish
seniority within grade, to determine eligibility for
promotion, and to provide for proper timing of the promotion
system. It is also used for determining promotion zones,
relative promotion opportunity and for the legal
determination of failure of selection. [Ref. 3:p. 24]
4 All-Regular Career Force
DOPMA intended to have the services achieve an All-
Regular officer force generally by the 11th year of service,
while still allowing the Secretary of the individual
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services flexibility on the specific point based on the
service's force structure. [Ref. 3: p. 24] This early-
integration of all Reserve officers into the career force
ended the anomaly of the career Reserve officer and his
vulnerability to forced attrition. The Marine Corps is
allowed 16,000 Regular officers, 0-1 and above. [Ref. 3:p
14]
Congress intended that selection into the Regular
force should occur mostly by the 9th year of service, with
the 11th year representing only the last of many
opportunities. Individual services are allowed to achieve
this Reserve integration earlier. However, if the services
chose to have an all-Regular force from the first year of
commissioned service, the effect would be detrimental.
Promotion to 0-3 would be difficult and outside of normal
promotion windows (4-6 YCS). A balance of Reserve and
Regular is beneficial. The Act also suggested that if
augmentation opportunities are presented at the 9th through
11th year of service, then they should be coordinated with
the selection board for promotion to 0-4. [Ref. 3:p. 25]
It is this provision of DOPMA which has the greatest
effect on augmentation. The legal constraint of an all-
Regular force compels the services to select the best of the




Congress did not desire that the All-Regular career
force and continuation procedure provisions go into effect
without providing some kind of a "safety net". The
separation pay is a contingency payment for a career-
committed officer to whom a full military career may be
denied. [Ref. 3:p. 30 3 This pay is designed to encourage
an officer to pursue a military career, while allowing for
adequate readjustment pay if he is denied this opportunity
under the competitive system. Separation pay is intended
to ease the transition back, into civilian life. Previous
laws allowed 2 months basic pay for each year of service up
to a maximum of $15,000. Officers with 5 or more years of
service received the maximum. DOPMA revised separation pay
to 10 percent of annual basic pay for each year of service
up to a maximum of $30,000. [Ref. 3:p. 31]
This change in separation pay had the effect of
making it even more costly to wait past the 5 year point to
select officers for augmentation. Separation pay has a
significant influence on an officer's career intentions. It
is sometimes the deciding factor on whether to stay in or




Both continuation and tenure are important to
officer retention and since retention affects augmentation
quotas, a discussion of DOPMA changes is warranted.
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The most significant continuation provision of DOPMA
is regarding the rank, of 0-4. Majors may be discharged
after the second failure for promotion, but it was the
strong desire of Congress that Majors be continued to
completion of 20 years of service unless in unusual
circumstances. [Ref. 6:p. 20] The retention rate of
Majors, as- will be discussed later in Chapter III, is an
important determinant of augmentation quotas.
In summary, DOPMA has provided the services with the
most comprehensive officer management plan to date. The key
provisions of establishing grade tables, retention of the
up-or-out system, creating the active-duty list, instituting
the All-Regular career force, increasing separation pay, and
the changes to continuation and tenure make DOPMA the
foundation of augmentation policy.
B. OTHER RELEVANT LITERATURE
The remaining literature on augmentation is primarily of
a commentary nature. Since no analysis of this topic has
been published, these commentary articles give insight into
the problems and perceptions of the Marine Corps
augmentation system.
Hammes [Ref. 7] discusses a few of the problems of
augmentation and Regular and Reserve junior officer career
opportunity differences. He suggests that all Marine
Officers should receive Reserve commissions, regardless of
source (i.e., OCS, Naval Academy, etc.), and all should then
27
compete for augmentation. Hammes states that NROTC
Scholarships and Naval Academy graduates are given
preferential treatment by receiving Regular commissions
automatically. The author says this severely restricts
augmentation opportunities because the Regular-commissioned
officers fill 70 percent of the total Regular slots
ava-ilable. He also states that these officers who receive
automatic Regular commissions solely due to accession
source, are untested as Marine Officers and should not be
awarded this career opportunity until evaluated either in
Officer Candidate School (OCS) or with an active unit in the
Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Hammes raises the omni-present
augmentation issue of marginal Regular officers displacing
proven Reserve high performers by taking up a large
percentage of Regular slots. This is a fairly prevalent
attitude among junior Reserve officers.
Hammes proposes that, in addition to initally giving all
officers Reserve commissions, the additional obligated
service requirement of NROTC and Naval Academy graduates be
kept. He argues that this will provide time to recoup the
investment in accession costs and provide these officers
with more opportunities to augment.
The author points out another subtle inequity between
Regular and Reserve junior officers. The active duty list
(or commonly referred to as the "lineal list") is the basis
for promotion zones and therefore "seniority" in each of the
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services. How an officer is initially ranked on this list
can have a long-term career impact. Hammes points out that
Regular officers (NROTC and Naval Academy graduates) upon
initial accession are placed on the lineal list based on
their academic standing in college. However, Reserve
officers are placed on the list based on class standing at
The Basic School (TBS). This system penalizes" the people
who do well at their first true Marine Corps challenge, TBS.
His suggestion that the Marine Corps rate each officer on
the lineal list with a combination of Officer Candidate
School (OCS) and TBS standing is sound. In fact, the system
was changed in 1983 to permit initial placement on the
active-duty list by class standing in TBS. However, Regular
officers, as a group, are placed above Reserve officers.
Armstrong [Ref. 8] raises the same issue as Hammes
regarding the lack of augmentation spaces due to those
officers initially commissioned as Regular officers. He
contends that we are keeping the best of our Reserve
officers, but what about the Regular officers? Are they the
equally or less qualified than the Reserve officers we
release due to failure to augment?
The author reveals that Hammes' suggestion of
commissioning Naval Academy and NROTC midshipmen as Reserve
officers can become reality. He cites Title 10 U.S. Code as
stating Naval Academy and NROTC Scholarship may be appointed
Regular officers, not must be. Tradition and policy - not
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law - dictate that Naval Academy and NROTC midshipmen join
the officer ranks with Regular commissions. [Ref. 8:p. 31]
Major Armstrong contends that while NROTC and the
Academy demand excellence of their members, these programs
do not equal FMF-tested experience. This is just one more
reason to cut back on Regular commissions to graduates of
these two programs. He does not, however, advocate the
elimination of all Regular commissions, since "lean"
retention times will come again and it helps to have a solid
source of Regular officers. This is an important point.
Regular officer input provides a stable manpower base for
the Corps, and a source of highly educated and intelligent
officers
.
Nevertheless, Armstrong suggests that the awarding of
Regular commissions be firmly tied to performance as a
Marine. He proposes that a small percentage of Regular
appointments be given to every commission source (OCS, PLC,
included) based on OCS performance, not on a scholarship won
as a high school senior. [Ref. 8:p. 30] Thereafter,
Regular appointments should be made available at every level
of career development such as TBS, follow-on specialty
schools, etc., all based on superior performance.
Additionally, he recommends quotas be given to squadron and
battalion commanders to meritoriously augment some of their
outstanding junior officers. This is a dangerous precept.
Comparisons of quality should be made grade-wide, year-group
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wide, etc., but not unit-wide. There is great potential for
abuse in this suggestion. Armstrong does recommend
retaining the Officer Retention Board (ORB), but he is
unclear as to how the inequity of selection between a
battalion augmentation board and a Corps-wide ORB would be
handled.
In summary, Armstrong's Article proposes that all
officers get an equal start and that augmentation
opportunities be more widely available. He advocates
linking augmentation to successful performance as a Marine .
His proposed changes would improve the officer corps and
allow "late-bloomers" time to grow.
Colonel Murphy [Ref. 9] provides a useful critique of
both Major Armstrong's and Captain Hammes' articles. Murphy
asserts that Regular commissions should continue to be given
to NROTC and Academy graduates. While not giving specifics,
he says that statistically, officers from these sources have
the best success rates in more demanding career courses,
such as flight school or artillery training. [Ref. 9:p. 35]
It would be interesting to see the data supporting this
conclusion or, if unavailable, undertake a study to analyze
the effect of commission source on school performance.
The author further states that NROTC and the Academy are
adequate screening programs and to reach this point of
selection required them to clear some substantial hurdles
that mark them as some of the top high school
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graduates/leaders in the nation. [Ref. 9: p. 35] He makes
the excellent point that these talented potential officers
will look elsewhere if there are not reasonable guarantees
for a career as a Regular officer. While OCS and PLC
graduates may be talented and come from outstanding
universities, Murphy concludes that they have not had the
lengthy screening, training or commitment of the other
officers. [Ref. 9:p. 35] In short, the Corps should not
penalize Academy or NROTC graduates because certain officers
are finding it difficult to augment in a given year.
A strong point of Murphy's article is that he discredits
using OCS and TBS performance as the only basis for lineal
list ranking and augmentation. He foresees those officers
whose appearance, size and ability to "grunt" the loudest
will get an advantage over the more "erudite" officers. OCS
and TBS alone are not foolproof screening methods. In
summary, Colonel Murphy asserts that we cannot divest
ourselves of proven Regular 'commissioning programs simply in
order to accommodate every dedicated officer.
Holland [Ref. 9] delineates the Marine Corps specific
knowledge that the Naval Academy provides to future Marine
Corps officer. First of all, Holland counters Hammes' point
that OCS is the "real test" of a candidate's mettle by
calling attention to "Plebe summer" at the Academy. He says
that re'quiring all Academy graduates to endure OCS,
inappropriately discounts the challenges of Plebe summer and
the rigors of military life at the Academy.
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The author further states that the Academy provides many
more opportunities for observed leadership positions than
do both OCS and TBS combined. Holland argues that Hammes
dismissed the amount of leadership experience at the Academy
due to a lack of information.
Holland counters Hammes' assertion that somehow Academy
graduates are' less informed on the Marine Corps. He states
the Marine Corps history is regularly covered in the
curriculum and that those midshipmen who "service select" as
Marines receive bi-weekly classes and lectures by Marine
officers at the Academy. Furthermore, Holland says that
most of the classes given at TBS are a review of similar
classes given to Academy midshipmen.
Holland sums up by concluding that the mixture of OCS
and Academy graduates is good for the Marine Corps. He says
the issue of a Regular commission is controversial, but that
one should not use the "flawed" reasoning of Captain Hammes
to settle it.
In summary, one can easily see that augmentation is a
sensitive issue, which divides the officer corps in opinion.
DOPMA has presented us with the tools for reform, designed
mostly to help solve the Reserve officer vulnerability
issue. Articles have been written on various policy
alternatives to increase augmentation quotas. However, it
is important to note that during the time period these
articles were written, augmentation opportunity had hit an
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all-time low of 21.5 percent. (see Table 8) What is most
evident in this review of relevant literature is that no
real analytical study has been applied to help answer some
of the questions like "Are we keeping the best?" While
statistical analysis is not the answer to the entire
problem, it can help diffuse some of the opinion-charged
alternatives that are currently being offered. The
augmentation issue requires orderly, systematic and repeated
analyses. To aid in this effort, this thesis will develop
the framework in which such analyses should proceed.
In the next chapter, the augmentation process will be
defined along with results of recent ORBs. This will
provide the reader with knowledge of the system and provide
the framework target areas to be used in Chapter IV.
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III. THE MARINE CORPS AUGMENTATION PROCESS
A. THE CONCEPT
DOPMA tasks each service to achieve an all-Regular
officer force generally by the 11th year of service. This
means that as each year group (officers commissioned between
1 July and the following 30 June) matures to its 11th year
of commissioned service (YCS), the population of that year
group (YG) should consist of all Regular officers. [Ref.
10 :p. 27] The Act further restricts the total Regular
Marine officer population to 16,000, excluding Warrant and
General officers. [Ref. ll:p. 73] Congress has authorized
an end strength of approximately 20,000 Marine officers,
both restricted and unrestricted officers on active duty.
What this means is that some 5,000 Reserve officers (after
subtracting Limited Duty officers) are required to meet the
needs of the Marine Corps. Each year the Marine Corps
accesses approximately 1,000 Reserve and 500 Regular
officers
.
The Regular officer cap of 16,000 is based on
Congressional intent for promotion time (10 YCS + 1 to
Major) and promotion opportunity (80 percent for Major).
[Ref. ll:p. 73] A Regular officer force above this level
would either force promotion opportunity down due to grade
table limits or drive the promotion timing window past the
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9-11 years of service guideline. Since the focus of the
Congressional guidelines is Regular officers, it is what
happens to this population which has the greatest effect on
augmentation. The number of augmentation vacancies is
dependent, in large part, upon the attrition of officers
from the Regular force.
The Marine Corps further breaks down the officer
population into categories. There are five categories of
officers based on military occupational speciality (MOS).
They are:
(1) Ground officers (GRND)
(2) Helicopter pilots (HELO)
(3) Fixed-Wing pilots (FW)
(4) Judge Advocate General officers (JA)
(5) Naval Flight Officers (NFO)
These categories, integrated with an officer's appropriate
year group, establish the Year Group management system used
by the Marine Corps. The size of a category within a year
group is a function of the requirement for that category.
Augmentation vacancies for the Officer Retention Board (ORB)
are established by comparing the optimum Regular officer
requirement for each year group category (ex. Ground 1980)
with its actual Regular officer inventory. The actual
computational method will be discussed later in this
chapter.
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In summary, the four main factors which drive the
augmentation process are:
(1) the intent to have an All-Regular career force by the
11th year of commissioned service,
(2) the limit on active duty field grade officers,
(3) Congressional guidelines for promotion opportunity
and timing, (which has the greatest influence), and
(4) projected Regular officer continuation rates.
Since the size of each year group is a function of these
factors, the number of augmentation spaces is sensitive to
any changes in these factors.
B. METHODS OF AUGMENTATION
The Marine Corps administers three basic programs for
augmentation.
(A) The Basic School Augmentation Program
The Basic School (TBS) is the initial six-month basic
course given to all new Marine officers. The
Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Edu-
cation Command is authorized to nominate 1 percent of
the total Reserve officer graduates in a given basic
class provided they are in the top 5 percent of their
class overall (Distinguished Basic School Graduate
(DBSG) )
.
(B) The Meritorious Augmentation Program
This program permits commands to nominate highly
qualified Reserve officers on active duty for aug-
mentation at any time after completion of The Basic
School. Commanders are urged to use the utmost dis-
cretion in nominating these officers. Meritorious
augmentation nominees are considered by the next
available ORB. Most importantly, Reserve officers
nominated for the meritorious augmentation program
are not subject to year group/category constraints.
However, due to past abuses of this program there is
now a limit that no more than 5 percent of the
number of General Augmentation ORB allocations can
be given to meritorious nominees. These nominees
then compete for meritorious augmentation.
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(C) The General Augmentation Program
This program is the primary augmentation program of
the Marine Corps. The ORB convenes semi-annually,
usually May and November, to review the official
records and applications of all officers who apply
under the criteria established in Marine Corps Order
1001. 45E and separate solicitation bulletins issued
by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). The ORB
recommends applicants within the quotas by category
and year group. The Board is designed to operate
such that in any year group and category only the
best qualified will be selected in competition with
their peers. An officer selected for augmentation
by the ORB incurs a 2-year active duty obligation
in the Marine Corps from the date of acceptance of
appointment as a Regular officer. [Ref. 12:p. 8]
The General Augmentation Program will be the reference
program for the remainder of this thesis.
Two other Reserve programs related to augmentation are
the Standard Written Agreement (SWAG) and the Extended
Active Duty (EAD). The Standard Written Agreement (SWAG) is
a contract tendered to a Reserve officer in the Ready
Reserve selected for return to active duty. These
agreements normally provide for 3 years of active duty.
This can be used as a preliminary step for a Reserve officer
to get on active duty and then apply for augmentation.
The Extended Active Duty (EAD) is an administrative
action deferring the officer's current end of active service
(EAS) date up to 1 year upon request or up to 5 years upon
recommendation of the ORB pursuant to a request for
augmentation. [Ref. 12:p. 9] Most common is the 5 year
EAD. EAD's are usually awarded to allow an applicant to
improve his evaluated performance, allow the officer another
opportunity to augment if his year group is closed and he
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shows promise, or to ensure that there are enough officers
to fill billet requirements. Back to back EAD's are not
awarded. [Ref. 2: p. 15] The 5 year EAD can be adjusted
downward to as little as one year at the request of the
officer. Some officers do not want to stay the total 5
years but rather stay another 1 or 2 years while continuing
to apply for augmentation. [Ref. 13]
Separation pay may be awarded to Reserve officers who
have completed 5 or more, but less than 20 years of active
service, if they are not accepted for an additional tour of
active duty for which they unconditionally volunteered.
Unconditional in an augmentation sense means that R.eserve
officers who request augmentation must agree to serve on EAD
if not selected for a Regular commission. An EAD may or may
not be offered, but the intent to serve must be included in
the application. Separation pay consists of 10 percent of
annual basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of
$30,000.
Another caveat of the General Augmentation Program is
the Directed Lateral Move. This means that Reserve officers
selected for augmentation can be involuntarily moved to a
new MOS. Directed lateral moves are used to staff MOSs
that are critically short (less than 85% of requirement) of
their Regular officer requirement. [Ref. 2: p. 15] An
example of directed lateral moves is shown in Table 5. This
Table shows the "over" MOS and the "short" MOS
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considerations used in application of Board guidance.
Notice that the "over" MOSs are mostly in the Combat Arms.
The reason for this "overage" in the combat arms MOS is due
to the "pyramid effect" of those specialties. The "pyramid
effect" is the name given to the manpower requirement/career
path by grade. The requirement for junior officers in the
combat arms is very large, due to the high number of billets
for those grades. However, as grade increases, the
requirement for officers decreases. If a large number of
officers were to be left in the "pyramid", time actually
spent in a combat arms MOS billet would be drastically
reduced in order to give everyone "field" experience. The
directed lateral move program is designed to keep the
optimal number of officers in each grade in the pyramid in
order to maintain sensible job rotation and tenure in the
combat arms MOSs, while at the same time alleviating
critical shortages in other specialties.
TABLE 5
DIRECTED LATERAL MOVE GUIDELINES FOR
ORB FY 87/1
% OF TOTAL
OVER REQUIREMENT SHORT NEEDED




1803 Assault Amphib. 314
[Ref. 14]
The Directed Lateral Move Program is not very popular with
junior Reserve officers. Many feel that they were evaluated
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in their first MOS and do not desire to switch. However, in
order to remain on active duty in the Marine Corps most
accept the move. The directed lateral move rejection rate
is less than 10 percent.
C. AUGMENTATION QUOTA DETERMINATION
Prior to 1985, augmentation quotas for the ORB were
computed by dividing the total available Regular officer
vacancies into a specific number per category. For example,
if there were 400 projected vacancies, 60 percent of this
number wo'uld go to the Ground category since the total
officer force is composed of 60 percent Ground officers.
This was a simple method, but it did not account for
category-specific attrition.
The quota determination process currently used by the
Marine Corps Officer Plans Section utilizes historic and
forecasted losses from the Regular force by category and
year group. [Ref. 10: p. 27] The actual computational
process is performed through the use of two microcomputer
based models, (1) the Marine Corps Officer Rate Projector
(MCORP) and (2) the Year Group Model which is part of the
Officer Planning and Utility System (OPUS).
MCORP is FORTRAN-77-based model developed by the Naval
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), which
utilizes historic inventory and attrition data on various
populations of Marine Corps officers to generate attrition
and continuation rates by grade, by years of commissioned
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service, and by category. The model can be tasked to
generate this data given the parameters desired. The
parameters that can be specified interactively are
occupation group, category (i.e., strength, loss, etc.),
years of commissioned service (YCS), grade, occupation,
source of commission, education, sex, component (Regular,
Reserve, both), ethnic group, and service schools attended.
There are many menus and submenus from which to choose these
parameters. Therefore, the operator can target a specific.
group within the Marine Corps officer population for
analysis. MCORP currently uses the last ten years of
historic data to produce an evenly weighted rate or weights
that can be user-specified. Table 6 is an illustration of
MCORP output.
TABLE 6
EXAMPLE OF MCORP OUTPUT
OCCUPATION GROUP: All
CAT: Strength
YCS: 01 - 09







SERVICE SCHOOL: Grad + Nograd
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TABLE 6
EXAMPLE OF MCORP. OUTPUT
(CONT'D)
YEAR INVENTORY LOSS CONT. RATE
77 5273. 851. 0.839
78 5281. 774. 0.853
79 4974. 703. 0.859
80 4590. 553. 0.880
81 4329. 511. 0.882
82 4542. 427. 0.906
83 5003. 477. 0.905
84 5302. 642. 0.879
85 5153. 937. 0.818
86 4494. 863. 0.808
MCORP continuation rates are designed to be an
accessible data base for OPUS when it is running the Year
Group Model. Presently, continuation rate data is manually
input into OPUS.
The Year Group Model was designed by Decision Systems
Associates, Inc. As a part of OPUS, the Year Group Model
produces output that is used to construct a Year-Group Plan.
[Ref. 15] The purpose of the Year Group Plan is to
determine optimal manpower figures within each of the five
officer categories (Ground, Helo, etc.) such that target
force requirements for Majors in each of these categories
can be met. Target force requirements are in the form of
the Grade Adjusted Recapitulation (GAR). The GAR is the
document that specifies the total number of officers in each
grade required to fill both primary MOS billets and a fair
share of training and other billets outside a specific MOS.
The GAR is run at least three times a year and whenever
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there is a change to the Authorized Strength Report (ASR).
The ASR changes when manpower requirements change in the
form of a Table of Organization (T/0) revision.
The Year-Group Model uses fixed promotion and selection
rates and flowpoints (as per DOPMA) per officer grade as
well as the continuation rates per grade/YCS from MCORP. A
steady state methodology is used to reach the solution. The
output generated includes the number of accessions needed to
meet the GAR-specif ied major target, as well as the
resulting manpower inventory for each grade/YCS. The model
ensures that the GAR goal is met for the user-specified
grade, but the data for the other grades is usually not met.
Additional output provides information regarding manyear
averages, projected losses for each grade/YCS as well as the
projected promotions per grade and zone. [Ref. 15:p. 2-2]
Table 7 is an output extract from the Year-Group Model
of OPUS. The example was run to determine the optimal
manpower inventory of fixed-wing pilots given a GAR of 310
in the 0-4 target grade. For instance, the promotion flow
point to 0-5 is 16.4 years, the selection rate above zone is
.118 and in-zone is .623. These selection rates produce 1.7
above zone promotions and 24.6 in-zone promotions. Manyears
refers to the number of fixed-wing pilots required per year
per grade. Accessions in 0-1 grade should be 94.8 fixed-
wing pilots in order to maintain a GAR of 310.
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TABLE 7
YEAR GROUP MODEL OUTPUT FOR FIXED-WING PILOTS



















































































The total column in Table 7 provides key information
used in augmentation quota determination. Since the
category was pre-selected as fixed-wing pilots, the total
column specifies the number of Regular fixed-wing pilots
required in each YCS and Grades 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3 to meet the
Regular fixed-wing pilot GAR for Majors of 310 in steady
state. These figures are subsequently compared against on-
board Regular officer strengths for the specific category to
45
determine where potential shortages exist. The total column
is treated as a "ceiling" figure. [Ref. 1]
The shortages determined by the comparison of the Year-
Group Model output and on-board strength are used to set
augmentation quotas. The first semi-annual ORB is given a
quota using exactly the difference in the figures. For
example, the November ORB would get a quota of 3 Fixed-Wing
augmentation slots if the on-board Regular Fixed-Wing pilot
strength was 87 in YG4, and the total column of the Year-
Group Model output specifies 90. For the first semi-annual
ORB the following equation applies:
Augmentation Year Group Model Regular On-
Quota for = Op-timal Strength for - Board Grade/YG
That Category Grade/YG Strength
The quotas for the second semi-annual ORB, which meets
in May, adjust the Year-Group Model output for the seasonal
fluctuations in officer attrition. The Marine Corps Officer
Plans Section utilizes another model which also computes
historic year-group attrition. The Officer Rate Generator
(ORG) computes historic average attrition rates by dividing
the total number of those who left by the total on-board
strengths for that period. What is desired is to forecast
the number of officers expected to leave the service during
the period and adjust augmentation quotas accordingly. For
example, if the model determined that historically 60% of
the attrition for YCS 3 occurs in the summer, and our
projected losses for the year were 2 officers, the
46
requirement would then be adjusted down to 89 officers (90-
1) . This figure would then be compared with the on-board
strength and a ORB ceiling set. In this way,- the second
semi-annual ORB assesses actual losses and adjusts the
"ceiling" figures up or down as required to ensure steady
state GAR goals.
YG vacancies are normally spread over several ORBs to
ensure that each officer has an opportunity to compete for
the available slots. This is necessary because of
variations in MOS training time, which in turn causes
variations in FMF and "observed" time. The FMF time
variations cause officers in the same category/YG to meet
the minimum eligibility criteria for augmentation at
different points in their careers. A category/YG "opens"
and "closes" to applicants based on attrition fluctuations.
Year groups with vacancies are considered and "opened" from
their third through eighth YCS to satisfy the 11th year
Regular force requirement. [Ref. 10 :p. 27]
In summary, the Marine Corps has made an excellent
transition to using microcomputer-based models and setting
augmentation quotas based on category-specific attrition.
OPUS and MCORP were designed to work in concert.
Unfortunately, a few "bugs" need to be worked out for this
to materialize. The concept and methodology of augmentation
quota determination is sound. All that remains is some
model refinement and interfacing work.
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D. THE CANDIDATE
Generally only company-grade officers (0-1 thru 0-3)
with a minimum of 12 months observed fitness reports, on
active duty and in a year -group and category designated as
"open" are eligible to apply for augmentation. Some field
grade officers (0-4 and above) are also eligible to apply if
they have not failed selection for promotion to the next
higher field grade and are Extended Duty or Career
Reservists on the active duty list of the Marine Corps.
This provides a sort of "grandfather" clause to pre-DOPMA
officers. Exact guidelines relevant to each ORB are sent
out in the semi-annual Marine Corps Bulletin 1040 (Appendix
A). [Ref. 16] This bulletin specifies the open and closed
year groups by category, the MOSs over or undermanned, and
announces recent updates to Marine Corps Order 1001. 45E.
The officers in "open" MOSs who are applying for
augmentation must select two MOSs from the "short" list to
be used as a guide for the ORB in recommending a possible
directed lateral move of an officer chosen for augmentation.
Competition for general augmentation quotas is on a
"best qualified" basis within year groups and categories.
Factors considered by the ORB are the individual's
performance and potential as indicated by fitness reports,
command endorsements, awards, educational background and TBS
standing. If an officer is not selected, he may resubmit a
request for augmentation to the next ORB. If an applicant
48
is not selected but determined by the ORB to be potentially
suitable for augmentation, an Extension of Active Duty (EAD)
may be awarded to allow more time for improvement of his
evaluated performance if he is close to his End of Active
Service (EAS). The awarding of EAD is also competitive
among augmentation applicants.
Two recent changes to the augmentation order have
assisted officers attempting to augment. First, Meritorious
Augmentation Program nominees are now eligible to go before
consecutive ORBs instead of once a year. This allows a
consistently high performer additional opportunity to
augment, especially if he belongs to a closed year group or
category. Secondly, officers who were not el iqible to apply
for augmentation when their year group/category was open
(due to training pipeline length) are now authorized to
submit applications for augmentation if they are near the
end of their active service commitment. These applicants
may even submit if their year group/category is currently
closed. This caveat applies mostly to student naval
aviators who drop from flight school and must retrain in
another MOS. This allows every officer who desires to
augment at least one chance to apply.
E. THE OFFICER RETENTION BOARD (ORB)
The ORB is composed of 12 members generally representing
all competitive categories. A Brigadier General is the
president of the Board and all other Board members range in
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grade from Colonel to Major. The Board normally is in
session for one month and meets during the months of
November and May. [Ref. 2:p. 16]
The Board officers undergo numerous briefings regarding
various aspects of MOS career patterns, unique MOS
qualifications, etc. This provides insight into those MOSs
that are unfamiliar to some Board members. The "discovery
process" is the period of time when Board members review the
cases and put together briefs on each applicant.
Consequently, each Board member is able to present a
concise, objective brief on each applicant, regardless of
MOS. Board members also take into account how fitness
reports are written and the nuances of the evaluation
system. Unnecessary "fluff" is discarded. Each applicant
is assigned a member of the Board to be his "briefer". The
briefer reviews the applicant's Officer Military Personnel
File (OMPF), Master Brief Sheet (MBS), and application with
photograph. [Ref. 10:p. 28]
The OMPF contains microfiche copies of all fitness
reports to date and other important documents pertinent to
an officer's career. The MBS is a short historical synopsis
of section B of the fitness reports, listings of schools and
awards, and other notable items. The MBS condenses the OMPF
and other data to enable the briefer to observe any trends
in an officer's performance. Each briefer handles
approximately 40 - 60 cases, so the MBS is a useful aid in
keeping the briefer focused.
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F. SELECTION
Each briefer "sells" his applicant to remaining Board
members using certain criteria. According to Mills [Ref.
13], the criteria in order of importance are:
(1) officer record/credibility in MOS
(2) endorsements from the chain of command
(3) TBS ranking
(4) MOS/follow-on schools ranking
(5) miscellaneous noteworthy accomplishments
The officer's record, based on the OMPF and MBS, is used
to assess the observed performance of the officer, billets
held, and relative ranking among peers as perceived by the
reporting senior (who writes the fitness report). This
criterion is the most important factor in determining
selection for augmentation.
Next, the endorsements from those in the applicant's
chain of command are reviewed. Comprehensive
recommendations by commanders in the endorsing chain of
command are a vital part of the application as a real-time
evaluation of an individual's performance and potential as a
career Marine officer. These are of great value to the ORB.
[Ref. 2:p. 11] Recommendations are usually based on
personal interviews with the applicant. An applicant is
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recommended including one of the following four
endorsements
:
a. recommended with enthusiasm; or
b. recommended with confidence; or
c. recommended with reservation; or
d. not recommended.
The Board would have to have other strong performance data
to select an individual with an endorsement other than (a)
above. Competition for augmentation is keen, therefore a
"lukewarm" endorsement does not work in the officer's favor.
Another important endorsement, though not specified in the
order, is the ranking of the applicant by the Division/Wing
commander among the other applicants from that unit. This
is a heavily weighted item by the board members. [Ref. 13]
This ranking is considered important because it is based on
previous endorsements from the chain of command and on the
personal interview of a General officer (usually the
Assistant Division/Wing Commander). A high ranking among
the other applicants is a definite "plus" for the officer.
TBS, MOS and follow-on schools, and miscellaneous
notable items are used to "flesh-out" the applicant's brief.
For example, special qualifications, the photograph and any
off-duty education are among the items considered.
Once the applicants that are to be augmented are chosen,
the Board then decides who will be recommended for a
directed lateral move to an undermanned MOS. Recently, less
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than five percent of the officers selected for augmentation
are recommended for a directed lateral move. An applicant
can decline the directed lateral move, but in turn forfeits
augmentation and is released from active duty upon
expiration of active service.
In summary, the process is run in a very fair and
professional manner. The Board receives guidance from both
the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps and is bound by oath. In reviewing the Board process,
there is little that can be criticized as being capricious
or cursory. Frequently, incomplete records hurt an
applicants augmentation chances far more than any Board bias
could. [Ref. 13]
G. ORB RESULTS FOR FY 1983 - 1987
Table 8 presents some of the key statistics from ORBs
83/2 to 87/2.
TABLE 8










b) (#AUG + EAD)/a
87/2 42.3 31.2
87/1 a)600 b)441 222 20 50.3 40.3
86/2 a)887 b)821 505 73 62.0 65.0
86/1 a)946 b)946 199 25 21.0 23.7
85/2 a)1077 b)739 185 17 25.0 18.7
85/1 a)902 b)622 134 15 21.5 16.5
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b) (#AUG + EAD)/a
84/2 28.9 36.5
84/1 1227 299 101 24. 3 32.5
83/2 1210 345 142 28.5 11.7
*a = Open/Closed YG(AUG/EAD) b = Open YG only (AUG only)
B. AUGMENTATION BY CATEGORY - (Open Year Groups and Meri-
torious Augmentation in Closed Year Groups)
% OPPORTUNITY
BOARD JA NFO HELO FW GRND
87/2 81.3 50.0 8.2 30.1 49.5
87/1 61.1 80.0 27.7 60.4 54.0
86/2 73.0 67.0 56.0 62.0 62.0
86/1 45.8 50.0 29.7 21.9 28.0
85/2 25.8 4.8 20.0 5.1 19.3
85/1 5.3 9.1 1.0* 10.3
84/2 31.2 11.4 15.4 12.6 27.7
84/1 33.3 20.0 26.2 15.8 24.0
83/2 26.7 14.0 19.4 19.2 25.1
*most officers in this category were in closed year groups





















































KEY STATISTICS FOR THE 83/2 THROUGH 87/2 ORBS
CONT'D
D. MERITORIOUS AUGMENTATION (FIELD/CLOSED YEAR GROUPS)
BOARD NOMINEES AUGMENTED % GEN AUG %
87/2 150 12 8.0 42.3
87/1 100 72 72.0 50.3
86/2 62 51 70.8 62.0
86/1 66 44 67.0 21.0
E. DIRECTED LATERAL MOVES
















*First year that some constraint was placed on the number
of TBS augmentees.
[Ref. 1]
In summary, this chapter has explained augmentation and
its concept, methods, quota determination, eligibility
requirements, the ORB, selection process, and presented the
results for the past nine ORB's.
Chapter IV outlines a framework for a detailed analysis
of augmentation as a manpower management process.
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IV. a FRAMEWORK FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AUGMENTATION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to assess the effectiveness or efficiency of
any manpower management policy, a comprehensive analysis of
the principal components of the policy must be undertaken.
In the previous three chapters, a review of the relevant
literature and a detailed description of the augmentation
process identified many fruitful areas of potential
research. The intent of this chapter is to provide a
description of the key areas requiring research and some of
the considerations that should be incorporated in each.
B. ANALYZING THE REGULAR COMMISSION
The first area of analysis should be the basic building
block of the officer corps — the Regular commission. Since
a Regular commission is the goal of many junior Reserve
officers, it is logical to analyze this type of commission
and its relationship to augmentation. In this regard, a
formal policy analysis should be undertaken to provide the
justification for awarding a Regular commission, to
determine when to award it in an officer's career, and to
determine the best officer force structure by type of
commission. For instance, should all new Marine officers be
commissioned as Reservists as proposed by Hammes? CRef. 7]
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What would be the negative spillover effects of this policy?
One undesirable effect might occur if, during wartime, a
large number of these Reserve officers left upon expiration
of their contract. A Reserve commission does not have the
caveat, like a Regular commission, regarding conditional
release from active duty. A Regular officer serves at the
pleasure of the President of the United States, and- as such,
must request release from active duty. Release from active
duty can be refused in time of national emergency. Though
this option has not been widely exercised in the past, it
provides the Marine Corps (and the other branches as well)
with a way to prevent substantial attrition from the junior
officer corps.
Another policy analysis issue regarding the Regular
commission would be determining what is the optimal mix of
Regular and Reserve officers. In addition to the officer
corps stability issue mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
some other considerations should enter into the analysis of
the optimal commission mix. For example, some basic cost-
benefit considerations of the Regular versus Reserve
commission for junior officers would provide a method for
determining an optimal mix. The costs should include not
only monetary expenditures, but opportunity or social costs
as well. What are the cost/benefit tradeoffs between
Reserve and Regular commissions? An example of a
cost/benefit trade-off in awarding the Regular commission
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concerns the tenure of a Regular officer. Since the first
true screening of Regular officers occurs at the Major
selection board, does the cost of allowing some Regular
officers who are marginal performers remain on active duty
for approximately 12 years outweigh the benefit of junior
officer stability that the Regular commission provides?
Another cost question is whether or not the Marine Corps
recoups the accession and training costs of Reserve and
Regular officers. Which, if any, type of commission allows
us to recoup these costs faster? Is the Regular commission
awarded to Naval Academy/NROTC graduates based upon the need
to provide enough time to recoup accession costs or to
provide a non-economic career incentive? In human capital
investment terms, does the Marine Corps generate a return on
its investment in Regular and Reserve officers? If so, how
much of a return and which type of commission generates the
larger return?
Cost-benefit analysis is but one of many considerations
that should be included in a policy study of Regular versus
Reserve commissions. Other considerations might include
career incentives, stability (as previously mentioned),
flexibility, retention, and performance.
Performance is difficult to quantify; however, an
analysis of Regular versus Reserve junior officer
performance could provide further justification for
awarding, or not awarding. Regular commissions to Naval
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Academy/NROTC graduates. The theme of the literature
reviewed in Chapter II of this thesis centered on the issue
of awarding Regular commissions to Naval Academy/NROTC
graduates. While Regular commission sources could easily
form a policy analysis in itself, the Marine Corps could
make some preliminary assessments of performance from
existing internal personnel files. A study to determine any
performance differences in junior officers by type of
commission could provide the Marine Corps with an analytical
base for its Regular commissioning policy regarding Naval
Academy/NROTC graduates. It is this policy that is most
often criticized when augmentation opportunities decrease.
An example of the type of analysis that could be used in
a performance assessment would utilize Section B of the
officer fitness reports. Though not a perfect measure.
Section B marks would provide the only quantifiable
performance data readily available for analysis. A CHI-
square analysis could be used to determine if there is a
statistically significant difference between the performance
of junior officers by type of commission. By quantifying
each mark in Section B [see Appendix B] (ex. Outstanding
9, Excellent = 7, etc. ) and computing either a straight
additive "performance index" or a "weighted performance
index" for each officer, the performance of officers
initially commissioned into Regular Marine Corps could be
compared with those holding Reserve commissions. The
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weighted performance index would assign a greater weight to
items in Section B considered more important. For exa'mple,
performance of "regular duties" would outweigh "additional
duties". The data is easily extracted from the Automated
Fitness Report file.(AFR) and could be merged with officer
demographic data from the Headquarters Master File (HMF).
This analysis could be conducted on either a sample of
junior officers or the entire population in the 01 - 03
grades. If there were a statistically significant
difference between the performance of Naval Academy/NROTC
graduates and Reserve officers, this would provide
justification for continuing or revising the current Regular
commissioning policy, based on which group performed better.
For example, if Naval Academy/NROTC graduates performed
worse than Reserve officers, then the automatic awarding of
Regular commissions to this group should be reassessed.
Without some analytical basis for justifying the current
policy, subjective assessments will continue to obscure the
issue.
A study by HQMC Code MPI-20 [Ref. 17], used selection
rates to Major as a performance measure and compared those
officers initially receiving Regular commissions (Naval
Academy/NROTC) with those officers who were augmented into
the Regular Marine Corps. The study found that those
officers who were augmented had a statistically greater rate
of selection to Major. However, this study is inconclusive
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because .it used a population of officers who had been
"purified" by the augmentation board. One would expect that
those who pass a screening process like augmentation would
have a better record, on average, with which to compete.
For this reason, the analysis proposed here would use junior
Regular and Reserve officers (prior to augmentation) and
their performance profiles provided by the fitness report.
This proposed analysis is but one of many variations
that could be used to justify current Regular commissioning
policy. Since junior Regular officers occupy potential
augmentation quotas, it is important that the Marine Corps
have an analytical basis for its Regular officer
commissioning policy.
This section has provided the first step in an
augmentation policy analysis by outlining a study of the
Regular commission and suggesting questions that should be
answered. Once the Marine Corps has justified the Regular
commissioning of Naval Academy/NROTC graduates and
determined the optimal Reserve/Regular mix, it then has the
basic foundation upon which to formulate/revise other
officer management policies, like augmentation.
C. ANALYSIS OF NEEDS
Although augmentation opportunity is affected by Regular
officer attrition, manpower requirements also play an
important role. Describing the determination of manpower
requirements is an issue beyond the scope of this thesis.
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However, a recent GAO study [Ref. 18] found that the
quantitative process the Marine Corps uses to determine
manpower requirements for non-FMF units and administrative
and support components of FMF units has shortcomings. The
report states that the basis of many Marine Corps staffing
standards is unclear. Of the standards they reviewed, GAO
found that almost one-third showed no indication that they
were based on workload, and none were based on methods
improvement studies [Ref. 18:p. 3]. Instead, they were
based on the judgment of Marine Corps officers or on
formulas of "indeterminable origin". GAO states that the
problems with the manpower requirements processes used by
the Marine Corps stem from inadequate oversight. The Marine
Corps has no specific guidance on when or how the various
determination processes should be used and documented.
[Ref. 18:p. 3] Nor does it sufficiently coordinate or
monitor the processes the various organizations use to
determine their manpower needs.
GAO did not want to create the impression that Marine
Corps manpower determinations were arbitrary and
uncoordinated, but rather lacking program guidance, work
measurement methods, and documentation.
The lack of oversight and documentation in manpower
requirements determination creates a doubt about the
accuracy of these "requirements". Poor requirements
determination could be a significant contributor to the
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decline in augmentation opportunity and/or adversely affect
promotion timing and flowpoint. For example, if the
requirements for company-grade officers (01-03) is
overstated and the requirement for field-grade officers is
understated, a bottleneck, can result in both lower
augmentation opportunity and a lower promotion rate.
It is difficult for the Marine Corps to assert that
augmentation opportunity is either sufficient or
insufficient when it has questionable requirements because
of how they were determined. Does the Marine Corps really
need the number of junior Reserve officers it says it needs?
The analysis that could be applied in this area would be to
review company-grade officer requirements and the
justifications for them. Ultimately, this clarification of
needs and the previous analysis regarding Regular
commissions expands the base of knowledge for an
augmentation policy review.
Along with the justification of needs, the Marine Corps
could benefit from studying the factors which affect junior
officer retention. Since retention is a key factor in
determining augmentation quotas, an analysis of Marine
officer retention could provide some insight. Retention
does not have to be a problem in order to justify its study.
Rather than wait for a problem to develop, documenting the
effect of various factors on the retention of junior
officers, and its ultimate impact on augmentation
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opportunity, can provide manpower policy planners with the
tools necessary to foresee the "peaks and valleys" in
retention. For instance, the Marine Corps could develop a
"retention early warning system" that would provide planners
with specific indicators that affect retention. For
example, an indicator might be the economy's impact on
retention. Some measures of the state of the economy might
be the growth rate of GNP or the rate of civilian
unemployment. There is a "general feeling" that retention
is partially tied to how well the economy is doing, but what
are the effects on Marine officer retention? What is the
magnitude of this effect? An econometric model regressing
the junior officer retention rate on various economic
indicators, such as GNP growth rates and the unemployment
rate, could be used to develop junior officer retention
elasticities which can be used for forecasting likely future
retention. This would allow planners to forecast
accession/augmentation quotas in the outyears.
The ultimate goal in analyzing retention factors and
their magnitude is to try to plan accessions and forecast
potential future requirements in order to smooth out the
fluctuations in augmentation opportunity. The Marine Corps
may find this knowledge of retention not only helpful in
studying augmentation, but in many other areas as well.
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D. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT AUGMENTATION SITUATION
The Marine Corps may find that an analysis of the
effects of current augmentation policy could prove helpful
in assessing whether further study is warranted. A question
frequently asked is "Are we keeping the best junior
officers?" A definition of the "best" is difficult;
however, performance is one of the suggested measures.
The study previously proposed for analyzing the
performance of Regular versus Reserve junior officers could
easily be applied to assess the quality of junior officers
retained or released. The two populations of interest would
be junior Regular officers who remain on active duty and
those Reserve officers who failed augmentation. The key
question is which population consists of better performers,
or are they equal? The methodology for a study of this type
would consist of the same Section B fitness report marks
used before in computing either an additive performance
index or a weighted performance index. It is important to
note that this comparison should be done by year group and
category in order to be consistent. This would reduce
extraneous factors such as age/MOS etc., from contaminating
the results.
The indices could be computed for each officer and a
Chi-square test run to determine if there is a statistical
difference between the two groups. Once again, the data is
readily available and easy to quantify. A quality
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difference in favor of Reserve officers who failed
augmentation would have significant negative implications
regarding the Regular commissioning policy of Naval
Academy/NROTC graduates. If the Regular officers who
remained on active duty were the superior performers, then
the awarding of Regular commissions to these officers is
justified.
A tertiary analysis to this one could use those Reserve
officers who were augmented as one group and those not
augmented as the other to see if the process selects the
best qualified. However, a major drawback of this analysis
would be the inability to-quantify such items as special
qualifications, awards, and endorsements.
A second analysis for assessing the current augmentation
situation could utilize an econometric regression model with
augmentation as a limited dependent variable. If an officer
successfully augmented the dependent variable would equal
one. If the officer failed augmentation, the variable would
equal zero. This dependent variable would be regressed on
such independent variables as age, marital status, ethnic
code, source of commission, sex, MOS, GCT, and other
pertinent variables such as the performance index. A Probit
or Logit model could be utilized. The variables found
significant and their coefficients could provide substantial
insight into the factors that help determine whether an
officer will be successful at augmentation or not. In turn,
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this knowledge would also let Marine Corps manpower planners
establish a profile of a successful Reserve officer. This
profile would be helpful in officer recruiting.
E. ALTERNATIVE AUGMENTATION POLICIES
The last area for analysis in the framework involves
analyzing the various alternative augmentation- policies.
For example, what would be the impact of augmentation on an
all-qualified basis? What is the optimal amount of
augmentation -opportunity? 20 percent? 50 percent? Each
alternative should be studied in a policy analysis which
would include costs/benefits, major problem areas, and the
feasibility of such a policy.
There are many ways to enhance augmentation opportunity
or redesign the system in order to allow it to be perceived
as more fair. Rather than short point papers, a formal
policy analysis of each proposed alternative would at least
provide more information upon which to base a decision.
In summary, this chapter has presented a framework for
the types of studies that could be undertaken in assessing
the Marine Corps augmentation system. None of the proposed
analyses would require extraordinary cost or effort, but
could easily reap benefits of great magnitude. If the
Marine Corps determines that augmentation should be reviewed
and analyzed, then this framework will provide a starting
point from which to begin.
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The next chapter presents an example of the type of
analysis that can be done to explore some of the effects of
augmentation policy.
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V. DATA AND ANALYSIS
This Chapter presents an example of the type of analysis
that can be used in evaluating the augmentation system.
Resource limitations have precluded this analysis from using
the extensive databases suggested in the previous chapter.
Instead, I have chosen to examine the Officer Exit Surveys
for fiscal years 1985 and 1986.
A. DATA
The Officer Exit Survey is a questionnaire administered
by HQMC to all officers who are leaving the Marine Corps.
The survey, developed by Mr. William Giffens of the Naval
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), is
similar to exit surveys used by the other services. The
average usable response rate on the Marine officer
questionnaire is approximately 30% of the total number of
officers who leave per year. Appendix C is a copy of the
survey.
The exit survey lists 34 categories which an officer
rates anywhere from "extremely important" to "not true or of
no importance" based upon how important he felt the item to
be in his decision to leave the Marine Corps. After
answering each question, the departing officer ranks what he
feels are the 3 most important reasons, of the 34, affecting
his decision to leave. These responses are collated and
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kept in a database at HQMC, A standard SAS program called
SYNCSORT developed by the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC) is used to process the responses and generate
reports
.
For purposes of this thesis, in addition to the survey
responses, a merge with the Headquarters Master File (HMF)
was performed in order to match relevant demographic data to
each survey respondent. Additionally, another merge was
performed to match this new composite file with each
officer's Section B Fitness Report readouts from the
Automated Fitness Report File (AFR). The end result is a
file which contains each officer's exit survey responses,
relevant demographic data, and a performance profile from
the fitness reports.
The Section B Fitness Report data was assigned a
numerical score for each mark. Appendix B contains a
complete officer fitness report. Section B is the relevant
part of the report, specifically items 13A - 13G
(performance criteria), 14A - 14N (personal qualities), 15A
(general value to service), and 16 (service in war). The





















Item 15A requires the additional values 2, 4, 6, and 8
to provide an interval scale to match the corresponding
responses. Item 16 is graded N or the values 6-9 to
correspond to each response regarding service in wartime.
For example, "prefer not" =6, "particularly desire" =9, and
"not observed" would equal "N".
The relevant demographic data on each officer consists
of the variables specified in Table 10.
TABLE 10
RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES EXTRACTED FROM





























The analysis will use this composite data file to search
for differences in two subgroups of this data population.
The first group will be those Reserve officers who failed
augmentation or were denied Extended Active Duty (EAD) . For
purposes' of this thesis, I will assume that those denied EAD
are also those Reserve officers who failed to augment.
These officers are assigned a Separation Designation Code of
LGJ1 - LGJ4 in the data set. The second group to be
analyzed contains those Regular officers who resigned their
commissions (Component Code 11).
The analysis will consist of the computation of
frequencies and cross-tabulations within each subgroup, and
then various comparisons between the two groups will be
made. The standard SAS program (SYNCSORT) for the survey
responses will be run on the members of each group in order
to compare their reasons for leaving.
One of the highlights of this analysis is the comparison
of performance data. This will be performed using a SAS
program to compute a straight additive performance index and
a weighted performance index. These performance indices
take each observed mark, in Section B of the fitness reports
on each officer, with its corresponding numerical value, and
divide it by the total number of marks for the report. The
weighted performance index multiplies each numerical score
by a weight which reflects the relative importance of the
72
item in the whole report. For example, "performance of
regular duties" is weighted more heavily (7) than
"performance of additional duties" (1). Table 11 specifies
the exact weighting scale as proposed by HQMC Code MA-20
.
TABLE 11
WEIGHTING SCHEME FOR A PERFORMANCE INDEX
ITEM WEIGHT
13a. Performance of Regular Duties 7
13b, Performance of Additional Duties 1
13c. Performance of Administrative Duties 3
13d. Handling Officers 3
13e. Handling Enlisted Personnel 1
13f. Training Personnel 4
13g. Tactical Handling of Troops 4
14a. Endurance - 3
14b. Personal Appearance 4
14c. Military Presence 3










141. Personal Relations 3
14m. Economy of Management 1
14n. Growth Potential 5
15a. General Value to the Service 6
16. Service in Wartime 5
The performance indices will be computed for each
officer and aggregated as a group to compare the performance
of Regular officers who resigned and Reserve officers who
failed augmentation or in a request for EAD. CHI-Square and
T-Tests will be used to test the null hypothesis that there
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is no statistically significant difference in the
performance of Regular officers who resigned and Reserve
officers who failed augmentation/EAD.
C. RESULTS
Tables 12 thru 14 contain the results of the statistical
tests.
TABLE 12





Freq %_ Frea %_
Male 237 92.9- 231 93.9
Female 18 7.1 15 6.1
B. Marital Status
Divorced 11 4.3 4 1.6
Married 180 70.6 128 52.0
Single 64 25.1 114 46.3
C. Race
Caucasian 238 93.3 226 91.9
Black. 16 6.3 16 6.5
Oriental NA - 1 .4
Other 1 .4 3 1.2
D. Education Level
Baccalaureate 234 91.8 231 93.9
Masters 14 5.5 8 3.3
Professional 7 2.7 7 2.8
Grade
02 53 21.0 107 43.5










REGULAR VERSUS NON-AUGMENTED RESERVE OFFICER
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (CONT'D)
F. Military Occupational Specialties
(Those with frequencies ^10
)









All other (Freq <10 and % <3.9) 149 58.5
2. .Reserve Officers (N = 246)
MPS FREQ %
0302 Infantry 36 14.6
7562 CH-46 Helo Pilot 28 11.4
7564 CH-53 Helo Pilot 25 10.2
0802 Artillery 19 7.7
2502 Communications 14 5.7
3002 Ground Supply 12 4.9
7501 A-4 Pilot 11 4.5
All other (Freq <10 and % <4.0) 101 41.0
G. Source of Entry (Top 4 Sources)
1 . Regular Officers
SOURCE FREp _%
NROTC Scholarship 66 25.9
Naval Academy 4 3 16.9
Platoon Leaders Class.- Aviation* 16 6.3
Platoon Leaders Class - Ground* 12 4.7
* = originally Reserve officers who augmented later
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TABLE 12
REGULAR VERSUS NON-AUGMENTED RESERVE OFFICER
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (CONT'D)
2 . Reserve Officers
SOURCE FREQ %
Officer Candidate School 83 34.0
Platoon Leaders Class - Aviation 64 26.0
Platoon Leaders Class - Ground 46 19.0
Woman Officer Candidate Class 11 4.5




Mean Std Dev Min Max Std Error
132.73 11.92 102.0 158.0 .76.
126.87 10.33 86.0 151.0 .68
Degrees of
Variances T Freedom Prob >
Unequal 5.7492 470.6 0.0001
Equal 5.7304 475.0 0.0001
Therefore, the T-Test indicates no statistically
significant difference in the GCT scores between
Regular and Reserve officers in the sample.
TABLE 13
SURVEY RESPONSES - THE TOP 10 REASONS GIVEN
FOR LEAVING THE MARINE CORPS BY TYPE OF COMMISSION
Reason
i&nJi. Regular Reserve
1 Suppressed initiative. Lack of confidence in
creativity, professional the fairness of the
stimulation fitness report system
2 Poor utilization of skills, Lack of confidence in
abilities, education the fairness of selec-
tion methods




SURVEY RESPONSES- THE TOP 10 REASONS GIVEN
FOR LEAVING THE MARINE CORPS BY TYPE OF COMMISSION
• (CONT'D)
Rank. Regular











Lack, of confidence in the







plan and control my
career
10
Lack of opportunity for
accelerated promotion
Unable to sufficiently
plan and control my career













A. T-TESTS OF OVERALL AVERAGE PERFORMANCE BY GROUP
Straight Additive Performance Index (PI).



























Weighted Performance Index (PI WGTED)














































then performance was unsatisfactory
then performance was below avg or avg
then performance was above average
then performance was excellent
then performance was outstanding
There were unsatisfactory reports using the





Col Pet B&Avg Above Excel Outst Total
Regular 7 22 212 191 432
0.54 1.71 16.46 14.83 33.54
1.62 5.09 49.07 44.21
41.18 33.85 29.40 39.38
Reserve 10 43 509 294 856
0.78 3.34 39.52 22.83 66.46
1.17 5.02 59.46 34.35
58.82 66.15 70.60 60.62
Total 17 65 721 485 1288











2. Weighted Performance Index (PI WGTED)
Assumptions
If 10.00 < PI WGTED < 20.00 then performance was unsatis-
factory
If 20.00 < PI WGTED < 30.00 .then performance was below avg
and avg
If 30.00 < PI WGTED < 35.00 then performance was above avg
If 35.00 < PI WGTED < 40.00 then performance was excellent







WEIGHTED PERFORMANCE (PI WGTED I































































D. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
1. Demographic Data
Much of the demographic data (see Table 12) were
unremarkable; however, there are a few areas which warrant
comment. For instance, the frequencies of sex and race tend
to reaffirm the fact that the Marine Corps junior officer
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population is mostly male (93%) and white (92%). Marital
status differences between Regular and Reserve officers were
noticeable in that Reserve officers had a higher single
percentage than Regular officers. The causes of these
differences in marital status do not have an obvious
explanation. The education level distribution was virtually
identical for the two groups. Grade distribution, as
expected, was different. The Reserve officer group was 43.5
percent First Lieutenants (02) while the Regular officer
group had only 21 percent of the officers in that grade.
Obligated service length is the primary reason for this
difference. Regular officers (Naval Academy and NROTC
scholarship) have at least 4 years obligated service (5
years in the case of Naval Academy graduates). Most Reserve
officer programs have a 3 1/2 year contractual commitment.
Therefore, with promotion to Captain (03) occurring at the 4
1/2 - 5 YCS flowpoint, first term Regular officers are
usually Captains, while first term Reserve officers are
usually just short of promotion to 03.
Military occupational specialities (MOS) provided
some insight into which MOSs were losing officers by type of
commission. Infantry led both tables as the MOS that lost
the most junior officers. There are several possible
explanations for this: (1) the large "pyramid effect" of
this MOS, where officer requirements decrease with grade,
causes a possible perceived lack of opportunity; (2) the
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arduous nature of the infantry -MOS (i.e. long deployments,
both shipboard and to the field); and (3) since it -is the
most populated MOS in the Marine Corps, it would naturally
have a proportionately larger share of the losses. Regular
officers showed losses primarily in the "Ground" MOSs while
Reserve officers had CH-46 and CH-53 Helicopter Pilot MOSs
as the second and third ranked loss MOSs. A significant
contributor to this loss of Reserve helicopter pilots was
probably the extremely low augmentation percentage for the
Helicopter category in the 85/1 ORB (see Table 8) of 9.1
percent. This low percentage not only forced some of these
officers out of the Marine Corps (assuming an EAD was also
denied) but more than likely also had a secondary negative
impact upon the career expectation of other Reserve
helicopter pilots. The loss of these highly trained Reserve
helicopter pilots is costly in terms of lost training
investment. The remaining MOS loss distribution is similar
once the Reserve helicopter pilot issue is accounted for.
The reasons for specific MOS attrition is beyond the scope
of this thesis.
Source of entry was distributed as expected with
most Regular officers coming from either the Naval Academy
or NROTC Scholarship programs. Reserve officers were
likewise distributed as expected.
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.Average GCT scores, a measure of relative
intelligence, at first seemed to be significantly different
between Regular and Reserve officers. Regular officers had
a mean GCT 5.26 points higher than Reserve officers.
However, upon statistical analysis using the T-Test, this
difference was found not to be statistically significant and
therefore we cannot infer a difference in mean GCT (or
intelligence) between the Regular and Reserve officer. This
result does not support Colonel Murphy's [Ref. 9] hypothesis
that Naval Academy/NROTC officers are a source of more
intelligent officers than other commissioning programs.
2. Survey Responses
The reasons ranked as most important (see Table 13)
in affecting the decision to leave the Marine Corps between
Regular and Reserve officers in this sample are
significantly different. Regular officers cite many of the
intrinsic aspects of the job as the primary reasons for
leaving. For example, the top 2 reasons given by Regular
officers for leaving the Marine Corps are "suppressed
initiative, creativity and professional stimulation" and
"poor utilization of skills, abilities and education."
Conversely, Reserve officers ranked other factors as the top
2 reasons. The top two reasons most often cited by Reserve
officers dealt with the lack of confidence in the fairness
of both the fitness report system and in selection methods.
By contrast. Regular officers rated these two reasons
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numbers 5 and 6, respectively. It is not unreasonable to
assume that those Reserve officers who failed augmentation
would feel that both the fitness report system and selection
methods were unfair. While this is not a startling
revelation, it does document the hypothesis that the reasons
given by Regular and Reserve officers for leaving are
different.
3 . Performance Analysis
The analysis of both the Straight Additive
Performance Index (PI) and the Weighted Performance Index
(PI WGTED) resulted in the inability to reject the null
hypothesis that there was not a statistically significant
difference in the performance between the Regular and
Reserve officer samples. Table 14 illustrates the
statistical analysis. Under the assumptions of equal or
unequal variances, the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis using a T-Test was quite low. For the Straight
Additive Performance Index it was less than 1 percent and
for the Weighted Index it was less than 2 1/2 percent. The
degrees of freedom were high because the tests utilized an
average of every report on the sample officers, not an
average of each officer's average score. Therefore, the T-
Test of overall average performance by group was
inconclusive. The null hypothesis could not be rejected in
order to conclude there was a difference in average
performance between the two groups.
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The CHI-Square analysis was utilized to provide
another test of group similarities/differences. A number of
assumptions were made in order to group performance index
scores into cells large enough to validate the CHI-Square
test. The assumptions are presented in Table 14 section
(B). The assumptions were based on how the total index
corresponded to original markings. For example, a
Performance Index of to 1 was unsatisfactory. The
Weighted Index was similarly grouped. The contingency table
of status (Regular vs. Reserve) by performance
(Unsatisfactory, Average, etc.) was tabulated and the CHI-
Square test statistic computed. Both the - Straight
Performance Index (PI) and the Weighted Performance Index
(PI WGTED) resulted in the inability to reject the null
hypothesis that there was no statistically significant
difference in the performance between Regular and Reserve
officers
.
Both tests regarding the performance of these two
groups do not confirm or deny that either group
outperforms the other, and as such are inconclusive.
Possibly the narrative write-ups of Section C of the fitness
reports would provide more performance evaluation; however,
narrative comments are virtually impossible to quantify.
In summary, this chapter outlined the data and
methodology, presented the results of the analysis, and the
author's interpretation of the results. Many interesting
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items were uncovered, but few conclusive statistical
inferences were drawn. This analysis was presented as an
example of the type of analysis that can be applied to the
suggested research framework in Chapter IV.
The final chapter contains the conclusions and
recommendations for the thesis.
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The following conclusions are based upon the
analysis performed in Chapter V:
- There is no statistically significant difference in
average GCT between the Regular and Reserve officers
in this sample
.
Augmentation within a specific category has an effect
on subsequent Reserve officer losses from MOSs in
that category. This was illustrated by the apparent
correlation of the 9.1 percent Helo category augmen-
tation percentage and the high number of Reserve
helicopter pilots who left the Marine Corps.
- Regular officers who resigned their commissions and
Reserve officers who failed augmentation cite signifi-
cantly different reasons as important in affecting
their decision to leave the Marine Corps. The Reserve
officers are much more concerned with the fairness of
the fitness report system and selection methods.
This is a result of their failure to augment. Regular
officers, on the other hand, cite job intrinsic reasons
such as "suppressed initiative" as their main reasons
for leaving.
- There is no statistically significant difference in the
performance between the Regular and Reserve officers in
this sample.
2. General
The following conclusions are based on general
augmentation research and the author's observations:
There is a general lack, of knowledge by junior Reserve
officers regarding augmentation; what drives the
quotas, legal background, etc. This lack of knowledge
leads to subjective judgments and misdirected effort.
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Many factors which drive augmentation quota determina-
tion (such as Regular officer retention) are virtually
uncontrollable by Marine Corps manpower planners and
cannot be attempted to be constantly readjusted in
order to make it easier for certain officers to
augment in a given year. Stability in the overall-
officer corps should take precedence over selected
junior officer career opportunity.
DOPMA was designed to be an aid to the Reserve officer
career and not a hindrance. DOPMA protects Reserve
officers from the "career Reservist" syndrome which
is a dangerous situation. The career Reservist may
have had 18 YCS and be a victim of a reduction in
force size. Both the Marine Corps and the Reserve
officer have less to lose under DOPMA. Reserve
officers should not blame DOPMA for augmentation
difficulty.
Current augmentation policy has been refined and seems
to be quite fair.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following actions are recommended as a result of
this research:
- Educate junior Reserve officers on how the augmentation
process really works and why it is designed as such.
In addition, periodically update these officers in
what they can do to help their chances to augment (for
example, update and review their records). Education
can be very helpful in squelching rumors and subjec-
tive assessments.
Utilize the framework for analysis in Chapter IV
before the next time the augmentation percentage
drops. For example, development of the "attrition/
retention early warning system" will enable the Marine
Corps to foresee manpower planning crises. It is
strongly recommended that HQMC sponsor much of this
research contained in Chapter IV through the Marine
Corps manpower students attending the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS). NPS has the resources and
knowledge base to assist in this area of research.
These resources, coupled with the Marine officer's
knowledge of the Corps, will provide a much better
product than a contractor-sponsored study.
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The Marine Corps should not make any significant .
changes in the method of quota computation for aug-
mentation other than refining the computer interface
between OPUS and MCORP. In addition, changes to the
augmentation system should be based on research, such
as outlined in Chapter IV, and not on the "wave of
opinion.
"
Enforce the completion of the Officer Exit Survey.
A 30 percent response rate can be vastly improved
through command attention. The information from the
survey should be tabulated and reviewed. In addition,
some composite performance files merged with the
survey responses may provide valuable insight for
manpower planners.
In summary, this thesis has attempted to provide a
starting point for objective research on augmentation.
Augmentation may or may not be a problem, but education and
information can~at least help determine if it is. Through
research, the Marine Corps can look for every opportunity to
improve augmentation or at least ensure that it is fair in
selection, and in accomplishing the Corps' force structure
goals. There is the painful reality that the Marine Corps
will continue to need a large number of high quality Reserve
company grade officers, and not all of them will have an
opportunity for a career in the Regular Marine Corps. This
may be difficult to explain to the hard-charging junior
Reserve officer who wants to stay. The current situation
places Marine Corps manpower planners at a disadvantage when
critics of augmentation come to call. A research base would
at least provide some justification for augmentation policy
changes or for remaining unchanged.
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I do not advocate mass changes to the augmentation
system nor costly research efforts. The framework in
Chapter IV provides some internal, minimum cost efforts to
help guide policy. The tremendous investment the Marine
Corps has in its officers more than justifies some research
into augmentation policy. If needs change, policies should
be reviewed and possibly changed. After all, it is the
unique ability to innovate that has kept the Marine Corps
alive for 211 years.
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1. THE FY 36/1 OFFICER RETENTION/ REOESIGKTIOB 8OAR0 (ORB) WILL
C08VENE OB S NOV 19U IAV SEF t THIS BULLETIN SOUCTTS APPLICATIONS
FROM RESERVE OFFICERS ANO RESERVE WARRANT OFFICERS WO OESIRE TO
APPtT FOB REJECTION: I.E.. AUGMENTATION EXTENSION ON ACTIVE OUTY
(EAO) OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY. AKITIONALLY. THIS BULLETIN SOLICITS
APPLICATIONS fROK LIMITED OUTY OFFICERS I LOO'S) FOR REOESIGNATION
AS UBRESTRICTED OFFICERS.
2. TO PROPERLY CONTROL THE REGULAR OFFICER STRUCTURE. THE
MARINE CORPS EMPLOYS A "YEAR GROUP* hauaGEMENT CORCEFT. (THE YEAR
GROUP IS THE SET OF ALL 0F-"CE?.S APPQIfcTEG IN A GRACE ABOVE CVO-4 IK
A I2-HBTH »i;;C3 FROM 1 JULY TO 10 JUNE. FOR EXAMPLE. AN OFFICER
WU^lMJUKtu I -Ut' lit- U A* w«« 4IKMI .}UW ««ll»t ** U*T ii»ih
COW'SSIONEO OB 1 JUME 19« IS IB YEAR GROUP 1985>. UNOER THIS CON-
CEPT. QUOTAS ARE ESTABLISHED TO GOVERN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGULAR
OFFICES! IX EACH 'EAR GROUP BY CATEGORY (6ROUW iGRNOi. FIXED-WING
(FWi PILOT. HELICOPTER (HELOj PILOT NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER <NF0>. ABO
JU03! ADVOCATE (JAW. THE REGULAR OFFICER POPULATIONS IN YEAR GROUPS
1976 TWROUG* 197E ARE ABOVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR REGULAR OFFICERS IN
EACH CATEGORY' IB THESE »£AR GROUPS. CATEGORY guOTAS EXIST ONL» IB
YEAR GROUPS 1579 THROUGH 1945
3. ELIGIBILITY REQUIPiHENTS FOR PETEI.TIOS! ARE OUTLINEO IN REF A.
IKSTRUCTICa FOR THE 3E3ESI6NATICB PROGRAM ARE OUTLINED II PARAGRAPHS
14 THROUGH 16 OF THIS BULLETIN. OFFICERS whQ OESIRE AUGMENTATION
ARE EKCOURAGEO TO APPLY AS SOCK AS THEY ARE ELIGIBLE IW REF A
ANO THIS 5ULLETIN. THE FOlLOWiSG AErttOKM. REOUIREHEBTS PERTAIN T&
UNRE5T3ICTI& FES-RVE OFFICERS. ANO RESE5VE WARRAKT OFFICERS WO OESIRE
AUGMSKTATIOK/EAO OR RETURK TO ACTIVE DUTY:
A. ONLY COMPANY GRAOE OFFICERS WITH 12 MONTHS OBSERVED FITNESS
REPORTS i SEE PARAGRAPH Hi. ON ACTIVE DUTY OR IN THE REAOY RESERVE
(SHCR OR IRR) ANO IN A YEAP-GROUP CATEGORY THAT HAS AN OPENING ( IN-
DICATED WITH "OPErr IB THE MATRIX BELOU) ARE ELIGIBLE TO APPLY F(J»
AUGHEKTATIOk OR RETURK TO ACTIVE OUTY
Y6 GRSC FV HELO BFO JA
15 OPEB OPES OPEB OPEN OPEN
84 OPEB OPEN OPEB OPEN OPEN
U OPEtr OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN
82 aosio OPES OPEN OPEN OPEN
81 aosio OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN
80 closed CLOSED OPEN OPEN OPEN
79 aosED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN
STEAK.
C, OFFICERS WHO ARE ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR AUGMCRTATIOB/EAO
ABO OFFICERS WO ARE ONLY ELIGIBLE TO APPLT FOR EAO WILL SUBMIT
THE SAME APPUCATIOB II THE FORMAT IDENTIFIED II ENCLOSURE (3) OF
REF A. ALL OFFICERS WILL IDENTIFY THEIR YEAR GROUP AID CATEGORY Tj
THE 1ITR00UCT0RY PARAGRAPH OF THEIR U FORM.
0. OFFICERS ELIGIBLE FOR AUGMENTATION OR EAO OBIT WD DESIRE TO
SUBMn A SEPARATION PAT STATEMENT. WILL SUBMIT THE STATEMENT INDI-
CATED IB PAR JA<1) OF ENCLOSURE (1) OF REF A. APPLICATIONS WITH THE
SEPARATION PAT STATEMENT MUST BE OATED 8T 15 SEP 1985 TO MEET THE
TIMING CRITERION FOR SEPARATION PAT IB PAR 3» OF ENCLOSURE (1) OF
REF A.
I. RESERVE CAPTAINS SELECTED FOR MAJOR WO ARE OB THE ACTIVE-
OUTT LIST WILL It AUTOMATICALLY PROCESSED FOR AUGMEHTATIOB WITHOUT
ORB ACTION. (RESERVE CAPTAINS ON A PROMOTION LIST TO MAJOR WO HAVE
MORE THAN 9 YEARS COMMISSIONED SERVICE PRIOR TO 5 NOV 19B5 ANO WO
ARE OB ACTIVE OUTT. JUT NOT OB THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST. MAT APPLT FOR
AUGMENTATIOS IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH.) RESERVE
COMPANY GRAOE OFFICERS IB THE SHCR OR IRR WITH MORE THAN 9 YEARS OF
COMMISSIONED SERVICE ON 5 NOV 1985 ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR THIS PROGRAM.
F. ALL RESERVE OFFICERS OB ACTIVE OUTT MUST HAVE AB EAS OATE OB
OR AFTER 1 MARCH 1986 TO APPLY FOR THE 36/1 ORB. HO WAIVERS TO
THIS OATE KILL BE CORSIOEREO. OFFICERS WO CAB NOT COMPLY KITH THE
1 MARCH 1986 EAS OATE CAR REQUEST AN ADMINISTRATIVE EAO VIA MESSAGE
OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FORM IAV ENCLOSURE 14) OF REF A.
4. WARRANT OFFICERS MUST BE ON ACTIVE OUTY OR IB THE READ* RESERVE.
RESERVE WARRANT OFFICERS OB ACTIVE OUTY WITH THE REGULAR ESTAB-
LISHMENT REQUESTIKS AUGMEffTATICW MAY BE OFFERED EAO'S FROM 1 TO 5
YEARS IS LIEU OF AUGMENTATION 3T THE ORB TO GIVE THEM AOOITIQNAL TIME
TO OWStilRATE THEIR QUALIFICATIONS 'OR AUGMENTATION. SIMILARLY.
ELIGIBLE RESERVE COMPANY GRAOE OFFICERS ABO RESERVE WARRAKT OFFICERS
IB THE REAOY RESERVE REQUESTING AUGMENTATION MAY BE OFFERED A STAND-
ARD WRITTEN AGREEMENT I SWAG). IN LIEU OF AUGMENTATION. TO PROVIDE
THEM AN OPPORTUHITY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR QUALIFICATIONS FOR AUGMEN-
TATION WILE OB ACTIVE DUTY. A SWAG WILL NORMALLY PROVIDE FOR 3
TEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY.
5. RESERVE FIELD GRAOE OFFICERS WO MEET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CRI-
TERIA MAY REQUEST AUGMENTATION ANO WILL BE PROCESSED WITHOUT 30ARO
ACTION: (1) CAREER RESERVISTS OR EITENOEO OUTY RESERVISTS OB THE
ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OF THE MARINE CORPS WHO HAVE NOT FAILED OF SELECTION
FOR PROMOTION TO THE NEXT HIGHER FIELD GRAOE; OR (2) RESERVE OFFICERS
OK THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OF THE MARINE CORPS. UNOER SWAG OR EAO
ORDERS. WO WERE SELECTED FOR PROMOTION WILE OK ACTIVE DUTY TO THE
GRAOE OF LIEUTENANT COLCKEL OR COLOHEL AFTER 14 SEPTEMBER 1981.
6. RESERVE FIELD SRAOE OFFICERS W3 ARE SERVING QK ACTIVE OUTY TO
PURSUE SPECIAL wORl iREF tB)>. OR IN A FULL-TIME SUPPORT STATUS (REF
(0), ANO HAVE NOT FAILED OF SELECTION TO THE NEXT HIGHER FIELD GRADE
MAY REQUEST AUGMENTATION. SUCH REQUESTS WILL BE CONSIDERED 5Y THE
*
_
', RETENTION I.E.. AUGMENTATION EAO. OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY
UNOER SWAG TOGETHER WITH LATERAL MOVES. IS USED TO HELP MEET THE
REEDS OF THE MARINE CORPS FOP OFFICERS IN PARTICULAR SKILLS. THE
MARINE CORPS POLICY OF ASSIGNING MOS'S TO OFFICERS IS BASED. IB PA«i
.
OK THE OESIRE TO GIVE AS MANY OFFICERS AS POSSIBLE AK OPPORTUNITY TO
SERVE IB THE COMBAT ARMS IN THE FLEET MARIHE FORCE AFTER COMPLETIOS
OF THE BASIC SCHOOL. THIS EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN IKVALUA8LE BOTH TG THE
INDIVIDUAL OFFICER ANO THE MARINE CORPS. IRRESPECTIVE 0' THE
SPECIALTY IB WHICH THE OFFICER MIGHT LATER SERVE. HOWEVER. THE
8T
B. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE LIMITED QUOTAS. RESERVE COMPANY GRAOE
OFFICERS IN ALL TEAR GROUPS. WO HAVE LESS THAN 9 YEARS COMMISSIONED
SERVICE AS OF 5 NOV 1985 . ABD ARE 03 THE ACTIVE-OUTT LIST MAT
ALSO APPLY FOB EAO. THESE OFFICERS MAY RECEIVE EITEBSICMS FROM 1 TO
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REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICERS III TH£ COMSAT ARMS MOS'S GENERALLY DECREASES
IK EACH SUCCEEDING GRADE WHEREAS. THE REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICERS IN
MOST OTHER MOS'S INCREASES IN EACH SUCCEEDING 6RA0E. A VOLUNTARY
LATERAL MOVE PROGRAM (REF 0) WAS ESTABLISHED TO HELP MEET THE
REQUIREMENT FOR UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS IN THE MOS'S OUTSIDE THE COMBAT
ARMS. WHILE SUCCESSFUL IN INCREASING THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN SOME
MOS'S. THIS PROGRAM ALONE HAS HOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO 8RING ABOUT A
DESIRABLE BALANCE OF OFFICERS IN ALL UNRESTRICTED OFFICER MOS'S.
THEREFORE. RESERVE COMPANY GRAOE OFFICERS SELECTEO FOR AUGMENTATION/
RETURK TO ACTIVE DUTY WHO HCLO A PRIMARY MOS IN WHICH THE MARINE
CORPS HAS AN OVERAGE OF OFFICERS may BE INVOLUKTARHY ASSIGNED A
NEW PRIHARY MOS IN WHICH THE MARINE CORPS IS SHORT OF OFFICERS.
S. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST Of PRIMARY MOS'S IN WHICH AN OVERAGE Of
COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS EXISTS ANO A LIST OF PRIMARY MOS'S IN WHICH
A SHORTAGE OF THESE OFFICERS EXISTS:
OVER SHORT
0302 INFANTRY 0180 ADMINISTRATION
0802 ARTILLERY 0402 LOGISTICS
1302 ENGINEER 2502 COMMUNICATION
1802 TAN! 3002 GROUND SUPPLY
1803 ASSAULT AMPH VEH
9. RESERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS REQUESTING AUGMENTATION OR RETURD
TO ACTIVE OUTY WHO HOLD A PRIMARY MOS LISTED AS 'OVER* IK PAR J
ABOVE. SHALL SELECT TWO MOS'S LISTED AS 'SHORT* IN THAT PARAGRAPH
IN ORDER 0? PREFERENCE. COtwakuInG OFFICERS *iLL CCw^kT Cw Tm£
APPLICANT'S CHOICES ANO/OR OESIRE TO RETAIN PRESENT PRIMARY MOS.
REF I SHOULD 8E USED AS A GUIDE TO ASSIST CC*MANOERS IK THEIR REVIEW
OF THE APPLICANT'S CHOICES. SUBSEQUENT TO SELECTION OF OFFICERS
FOF RETEKTIOM. THE ORB WILL REVIEW THE APPLICATIONS OF OFFICERS
WHO ARE IK 'OVER' MOS'S AND RECOMKENO THE ASSIGNMENT OF A NEW
PRIMAP> MOS OR RETENTION OF THE CURRENT MOS 3ASED UPON THE NEEDS
Of THE MARINE CORPS. THE COMKANOING OFFICER'S ENDORSEMENT. ANO THE
DESIRES OF THE APPLICANT.
10. APPLICATIONS FOR AUGMENTAT10N. EAO. OR RETURN TO ACTIVE OUTY
VILL BE MADE ON AB ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FORM (NAVMC 10274 l ANO
SUBIITTEL TO THE COMKMOANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 'CMC) immOA-3) VIA
THE CHAIN OF CQMMANO. APPLICATIONS WILL BE Hi ACCORDANCE WITH ENCLO-
SURE (2 > OF REF A ALL APPLICATIONS (INCLUOIMG MERITORIOUS 'i WILL IN-
DICATE CURRENT COMMAND PHONE KUK8EBS. ALL APPLICATIONS WILL 8E _SU6_^_
jUJIiLTO THE CMC IMMOA-3 1 BY 1 OCTOBER 1385. EXTENSIONS TO THIS
DEADLINE WILL 3E REQUESTED VIA MESSAGE ANO WILL BE GRANTED ONLY IN
EXTREH; CASES. THE1 MESSAGE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION WILL INCLUDE THE
KAKE. SSM. ANO LATERAL MOVE CHOICES OF THE APPLICANT. IF APPLICABLE.
AEO THE REASON FOR THE DELAY OFFICERS WHO 00 NOT NOTIFY CMC
(HMOA-3) EITHER VIA APPLICATION OR MESSAGE BY 1 OCTOBER 1985 WILL NOT
BE COKSIOEREO BY THE 50AR0. ORIGINAL APPLICATIONS OF THOSE O'FICEP.S
WW WtPE GRAKTED EXTENSIONS OF THE 1 OCTOBER 1935 OEADLINE THAT 00
NOT ARRIVE BY THE CONVENING OATE OF THE BOARD WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED
8Y THE BOARD.
11. AIL RESERVE OFFICERS APPLYING TO ORB 36/1 SHOULD REVIEW THEIR
OFFICIAL RECORDS FOP COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY. THE ORB USES TWO
DOCUMENTS IN THE EVALUATION OF OFFICERS REQUESTING AUGMENTATION. EAO
OS RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY: THE MASTER BRIEF SHEET (MBS) AND THE
OFFICIAL MILITARY PERSONNEL FILE (OMPFi. THE MBS SUMMARIZES THE
FITNESS REPORT MARKINGS IN THE OFFICER'S RECORD AT HEADQUARTERS. AND
THE OHPF IS THE MICROFICHE OF AN OfFICER'S PERSONNEL RECORD . FITNESS
REPORTS APPEARING OR THE MBS SHOULD ALSO APPEAR OR THE OMPF FOR THE
EVALUATION DOCUMENTS TO 8E COMPLETE. THE MBS MAY BE OBTAINED 8Y
WRITING TO CMC (NKCE). HEADQUARTERS. U.S. MARIHE CORPS. WASHINGTON
DC 20380-0001. THE OMPF MAY BE OBTAINED 3Y WRITING TO CMC (MMRB-10)
HEADQUARTERS. U.S. MARIH CORPS. WASHINGTON X 20330-0001. OFFICERS
JHOULO ALSO ENSURE THAT GCT SCORES ARE IK MMS. AW DOCUMENTATION OF
COLLEGE DEGREES ARE IK THE OMPF. THE ACCURACY Of OFFICIAL RECORDS IS
A PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY (REF F REFERS).
12. OFFICERS MUST NOTIFY CMC (MMRB-10) OF ANY DISCREPANCIES AND
INCLUDE. WHERE POSSIBLE. COPIES Of DOCUMENTS DETERMINED TO BE MISSING
fROM THE OMPF. ONCE THE ORB SOLICIATICW PERIOD ENDS (1 OCTOBER 85).
A COPY OF ANY MISSING FITNESS REPORT OR ANY FITNESS REPORT THAT WILL
ROT ARRIVE AT HEADQUARTERS IK TIME FOR THE SGARO SHOULD BE TELECOPIED
TO HEAOQUARTERS MARINE CORPS AT TEL: AREA CODE (202) 694-2803 OR
AUTOVOK 224-2803. ATTN: OFFICER RETENTION BOARD. ORIGINAL FITNESS
REPORTS WILL NOT BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICER RETENTION BOARD".
13. TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY RETENTION PROGRAM. AN OFFICER MUST
HAVE A MINIMUM OF LZ MONTHS OF OBSERVED FITNESS REPORTS. EXCLUOING
ACAOEMIC REPORTS. BY 1 OCTOBER 85. IT IS REQUESTED THAT COMMANDS
VERIFY LENGTH Of OBSERVED FITNESS REPORTS ON ANY OFFICER IK QUESTION
BY CONTACTING CMC (MMCE) BEFORE FORVAROIKG APPLICATIONS.
14. LIMITED OUTY OFFICERS WHO MEET THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE
ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR REDESIGNATE AS REGULAR UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS:
A. MUST BE QUALIFIED TO HOLD J CATEGORY I MOS THAT IS IN THE
SAME OCCFLD AS THE APPLICANT'S PRIHARY MOS. THIS REQUIREMENT MAY
BE WAIVED FOR LOO'S WHOSE OCCFLD OOES NOT CONTAIN A CATEGORY I MOS.
PROV10E0 THEY CAN DEMONSTRATE QUALIFICATION TO HOLD A CATEGORY I MOS
AS A PRIMARY MOS.
8. HAVE A BACCALAUREATE DEGREE FROM A REGIONALLY ACCREDITED
COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY. THIS REQUIREMENT MAY BE WAIVED ONLY IK
EXCEPTIONAL CASES. THE APPLICAKT'S COMHAKDIKG OFFICER MUST RECOMKEJB
SULM A *AlVtK AND IBUlLAIt IHt HROuRLSS MAOE BY THE APPLICAN1
TOWARD COMPLETION OF THE OEGREE. THE APPLICANT SHALL INCLUDE IN
THE APPLICATION AN OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF ALL COLLEGE WORK.
C. MUST HAVE COMPLETED AT LEAST 2 YEARS OF SERVICE AS AN LOO.
D. MUST NOT 5E OK A PROMOTION LIST.
E. MUST BE AELE TO COMPLETE 20 YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED
SERVICE BEFORE ATTAINMENT OF AGE 55
F. MUST BE RECOMMENOED FOR REOESIGKATIOK BY THE COMMANDING
OFFICER/COMMANDING GENERAL.
G. MUST NOT BE SU3JECT TO MANOATORY RETIREMENT FOR YEARS Of
SERVICE AS AN LDO BEFORE 1 JULY 1986.
15. AK OFFICER OESIGNATEO FOP LlKITED DUTY MA* ROT 3: CONSIDERED FOr
REOESIGNATION AS AN UNRESTRICTED OFFICE? MORE THAK TWICE IK THE
COMMISSIONED GRAOE IN WHICH SERVING.
16. APPLICATIONS FOR REOESIGNATION FROM LOO TO UNRESTRICTED
OFFICER MUST INCLUDE:
A. CURRENT PRIMARY ANO AOOITIONAL MOS'S.
B. CATEGORY I MOS FOR WHICH APPLYING.
C. DATE OF BIRTH
0. DATE APPOINTED WARRAKT OFFICER, W-I (IF APFLICAEi-E t
.
E. DATE APPOINTED LDO.
F. PROOF OF A BACCALUAREATE OEGREE OR COLLEGE WORR COMPLETED.
G. CURRENT PHOTOGRAPH IN ACCO'OAKCI WITH SE? (G).
H. COMMANO "HONE NUMBERS.
THE APPLICATION MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: *I UNDERSTAND
THAT IF SELECTED FOR REDESIGNATE AS A REGULAR UNRESTRICTED OFFICE?
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KENT FOR REGULAR UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS.' REOESIGNATION APPLICATIONS
MUST BE SUBMITTED BY 1 OCTOBER 1985.
17. COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMANDERS IN THE ENDORSING
CHAIN Of COMMAND ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF EACH APPLICATION SUBMITTED
FOR RETENTION OR REOESIGNATION. THEY ARE OF GREAT VALUE TO THE ORB
IN EVALUATING AN OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL FOR ACTIVE
SERVICE. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON PERSONAL INTERVIEW/ SCREENING
BOARDS ARE ALSO AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SELECTION PROCESS.
ENDORSEMENTS AT REGIMENTAL/GROUP LEVEL* WILL INCLUDE THE APPLICANT'S
RELATIVE STANOING AMONG ALL APPLICANTS. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE RECOMMENDATION:
A. RECOMMENDED WITH ENTHUSIASM: OR
8. RECOMMENDED WITH CONFIDENCE: OR
C. RECOMMENDED VITH RESERVATION; OR
0. NOT RECOMMENDED
18. THE COMMANDING OFFICER WILL DIRECT THAT A REVIEW OF THE OFFI-
CER'S HEALTH RECORO 8£ KAOE BY A LOCAL MEDICAL AUTHORITY. THE COM-
MANDING OFFICER WILL INDICATE IN THE F0RWAR01NG ENDORSEMENT WHETHER
THE OFFICER IS MEDICALLY QUALIFIED BASED ON THIS REVIEW. NO PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION IS NECESSARY UNLESS THE OFFICER IS SERVING IN A MEDICALLY
RESTRICTED STATUS. OR IS IN ANY OTHER WAY CONSIDERED PHYSICALLY UNFIT
FOR DUTY IN THAT CASE. A MEDICAL EXAMINATION IS REQUIRED. ANt THE
APPLICATION
-
WITH COMPLETED REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND REPORT
Of HEDICAL rilSTORV iSr'3 si mu 93) WILL SE rufMmiiuEu TO CXC (MnCAi
VIA THE COHMANOEP. NAVAL MEDICAL COMMANO
19. REF H REQUIRES THAT SUBMISSION OF AN APPLICATION FOR AUGMENTA-
TION MUST BE REPORTED BY UNIT 01ARY ENTRY. COMMANDS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED IN PAR 80*8. I OF REF H
20. THE NAMES OF OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR AUGMENTAT10N/REDES1GNAT10N
MUST BE APPROVED B> THE SECRETARY Of THE NAVY AND NOMINATED BY THE
PRESIDENT TO THE SENATE FOR CONFIRMATION THE NAMES Of OFFICERS
RECOMMENDED FOP EAC OR SWAG MUST BE APPROVED BY THE COMMANOANT OF
THE MARINE CORPS. THE NAMES OF ALL OFFICERS RECOMMENCED FOP RETEN-
TION (AUGMENTATION. SWAG. OR EAO) OR REOESIGNATION WILL BE RELEASED
BY ALMAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE SECRETARY Of THE NAVY APPROVES
THE LIST Of OfFICERS RECOMMENDED TOR AUGMEHTATIOK/REDESIGNATIOK
SECRETARY Of THE NAVY APPROVAL IS NOT ANTICIPATED UNTIL 2 JANUARY
1986
21. COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL ENSURE THAT THIS 8UILETIN IS BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL OFFICERS ELIGIBLE FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER
ITS PROVISIONS. IN AOOITlOt.'. THE COMMANDING 6ENERAL. <TH MARINE
DIVISION; THE COMMANDING GENERAL. ITH MARINE AIRCRAFT WING. AND THE
DIRECTOR MARINE CORPS RESERVE SUPPORT CENTER V1LL ENSURE THAT
ELIGIBLE OFFICERS IK THE READY RESERVE ARE IHFORMEI OF THEIR
OP'ORTUNITY TO APPLY fOR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY. COMMANDING OFFICERS
SHOULD NOT DISCOURAGE ELIGIBLE OFFICERS FROM APPLYING FOR RETENTION
OB ACTIVE DUTY. BUT SHOULD RECORO THEIR CONCERNS. IF ANY. ABOUT AN
OFFICER'S QUALIFICATIONS IN THEIR ENDORSEMENTS.
22. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF DUE DATES/MILESTONES:
A. 15 SEPTEMBER 1985 • ALL REQUESTS FOR AOMIN EAO TO ENSURE
MINIMUM EAS ELIGIBILITY OF 1 MARCH 1986 fOR ORB 36/1 DUE.
B. 15 SEPTEMBER 1985 • ALL AA fORMS MUST BE DTD NO LATER THAN
THIS OATE TO MEET THE TIMING CRITERION FOR SEPARATION PAY.
C. 1 OCTOBER 1985 - ALL RETENTI0N/REDES1GNAT10N REQUESTS DUE.
00 EXCEPTIONS UNLESS WAIVER MESSAGE RECEIVED BY CMC IMM0A-3) PRIOR TO
1 /VTrtOrO 1A1C
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APPENDIX B: USMC FITNESS REPORT
a us. governmcnt painting o*nc& 19
USMC FITNESS REPORT (1610)
NAVMC 10*33 (»•». 2-RSI
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APPENDIX C: USMC OFFICER EXIT SURVEY
MMK 11172 (H5) (19211)

















* 2. Marin* Corp*
•" Exportonco
The questions on the
back of this form are
worded to allow you to
"express your reasons
"for separating. Please
u indicate how satisfied
























































































































(For Reserve Officer* Only)
How many times have you







O 5 or more
YOUR SINCERE RESPONSES ARE NEEDED TO HELP
IMPROVE DECISIONS AFFECTING MARINE CORPS
PERSONNEL
MARKING INSTRUCTIONS
Use only No. 2 pencils.
Make heavy black marks that fill the circle COMPLETELY .
Erase clearly any answer you wish to change.
Make no stray marks on the answer sheet
Complete the front and back of the form.
Complete Block # 6 "Special Answer Section* in the lower
right-hand corner only if you have been given special
instructions to do so.




Every separating officer shall be requested to complete this
questionnaire for the benefit of future Marines. If an officer refuses
to complete this questionnaire, mark "decline* in "Completion
Check" (box #5) and complete boxes "Name" (3) and "Social
Security No ' (4). If the officer completes the form, check to make
sure there are no extraneous marks and no obvious failures to
follow directions. Then mark "verified" in the "Completion Check"
box (#5). A form must be submitted for every officer separating.
2. These forms may be accumulated up to one week. Mail
completed original forms in the standard fashion for optically
scannable forms (OO NOT FOLD. STAPLE OR PUNCH HOLES IN
THE FORM) to:
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(CODE MPI-20)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20380-0001
3. At times, special instructions for completing the "Special Answer
Section" will be distributed. The special instructions should accom-
pany this questionnaire when it is presented to the separating
marine.




UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED COMPLETE BLOCKS
1 THROUGH S, THEN GO DIRECTLY TO THE BACK OF
THE FORM.
6. Special Answer Section (Use only If Instructed)
1 ©@©®® 11 ©®©@© 21 ®®©®©
2 ©©©©© 12 ®©©@© 22 ®©©@©
3 ©©©©© 13 ©@©®© 23 ®®©@©
4 ©®©©© 14 ®®©@© 24 ®®©©©
8 ©©©©© 18 ©©©©© 28 ®®©®©
S ®®©®© • ©©©©© 28 ®®©©©
7 ®@©©© 7 ©©©©© 27 ©®©®©
S ©©©©© 8 ®@©©© 28 ®®©@©
9 ®®©@© 9 ®©©@© 29 ®©©@©
10 ®®©®@ i10 ®®©@© 30 ®@©©©
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im
If you are VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING. How important has
each of the following been in your decision to separate?
If you are INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATING or RETIRING. How






Not Trua or of No Importanca
B
L
After completing A, indicate
here the 1st, 2nd. and 3rd
most important reasons.
Mark Only On* in Each Column
Of tha 34 possible reasons ....
Important rMion?
. . . What Is Ml*
sacond most
important reason?
1 OOOOO Insufficient pay and/or allowances
2 OOOOO PaY and allowances for higher ranks are too low
3 OOOOO P°or quality/availability of living Quarters
* OOOOO Poor BOQ facilities
8 OOOOO Lack °' adequate dependent medical care
• OOOOO P°or quality of commissary/exchange
7 OOOOO Lack of opportunity to specialize
•OOOOO Long hours and work pressures .-,
9 OOOOO P°or utilization of abilities, skills, education
10 OOOOO Insufficient personnel/equipment support
11 OOOOO Too much paperwork (administrative tasks, inspections, procedures).
12 OOOOO Can't get the education or technical training I want
13 OOOOO Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation
14 OOOOO Too much crises management
18 OOOOO Believe my performance record is not competitive enough for promotion
18 OOOOO Dislike of military life style/restricting rules and regulations
17 OOOOO La *1 of freedom to use non-working hours as I want ,
18 OOOOO * non-caring monitor (assignment desk)
It OOOOO Unable to sufficiently plan and control career
20 OOOOO Lack of command opportunity
21 OOOOO Limited duty assignments (type)
22 OOOOO Can't get the assignment location I want
23 OOOOO Geographic instability/frequency of PCS moves
24 OOOOO Lack of confidence in fairness of fitness report system
28 OOOOO Lack of opportunity for accelerated promotion
28 OOOOO Lack of confidence in selection methods
27 OOOOO Unable to obtain desired MOS
28 OOOOO Possible erosion of benefits (retirement commissary, medical, etc.) . .
.
29 OOOOO Too much family separation
30 OOOOO My spouse does not want me to stay in the Marine Corps
31 OOOOO Lack of respect by juniors/seniors
32 OOOOO Lack of adequate dependent dental care
33 OOOOO Too much sexual harassment




































































































Please check to be sure you have answered every item on the front
and back of this form If the items (above) do not adequately reflect
your reasons for separating, please state your reason within the box




DO NOT WRITE OUTSIDE THIS BOX
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